Tables and graphs
"A Growing Rift of Values"

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Table 1: Countries and years included in the sample

Country	Year	Country (cont.)	Year (cont.)
Albania	1998, 2002	Luxembourg	1999
Andorra	2005	Macedonia	1998, 2001
Armenia	1997	Malaysia	2006
Azerbaijan	1997	Mali	2007
Argentina	1984, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2006	Malta	1983, 1991, 1999
Australia	1981, 1995, 2005	Mexico	1981, 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005
Austria	1990, 1999	Moldova	1996, 2002, 2006
Bangladesh	1996, 2002	Morocco	2001, 2007
Belgium	1981, 1990, 1999	Netherlands	1981, 1990, 1999, 2006
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1998, 2001	New Zealand	1998, 2004
Brazil	1991, 1997, 2006	Nigeria	1990, 1995, 2000
Bulgaria	1990, 1997, 1999, 2006	Norway	1982, 1990, 1996, 2007
Burkina Faso	2007	Pakistan	1997, 2001
Canada	1982, 1990, 2000, 2006	Peru	1996, 2001, 2006
Chile	1990, 1996, 2000, 2006	Philippines	1996, 2001
Colombia	1997, 1998, 2005	Poland	1989, 1990, 1997, 1999, 2005
Croatia	1996, 1999, 2006	Portugal	1990, 1999
Cyprus	2006	Romania	1993, 1998, 1999, 2005
Czech Republic	1990, 1991, 1998, 1999	Russian Federation	1990, 1995, 1999, 2006
Denmark	1981, 1990, 1999	Serbia	2006
Dominican Republic	1996	Serbia and Montenegro	1996, 2001
El Salvador	1999	Singapore	2002
Ethiopia	2007	Slovakia	1990, 1991, 1998, 1999
Estonia	1990, 1996, 1999	Slovenia	1992, 1995, 1999, 2005
Finland	1981, 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005	South Africa	1982, 1990, 1996, 2001, 2006
France	1981, 1990, 1999, 2006	South Korea	1982, 1990, 1996, 2001, 2005
Georgia	1996, 2009	Spain	1981, 1990, 1995, 1999, 2000, 2007
Germany†	1981, 1990, 1997, 1999, 2006	Sweden	1982, 1990, 1996, 1999, 2006
Ghana	2007	Switzerland	1989, 1996, 2007
Greece	1999	Taiwan	1994, 2006
Guatemala	2004	Tanzania	2001
Hungary	1991, 1998, 1999	Thailand	2007
Iceland	1984, 1990, 1999	Trinidad and Tobago	2006
India	1990, 1995, 2001, 2006	Turkey	1990, 1996, 2001, 2007
Indonesia	2001, 2006	Uganda	2001
Ireland	1981, 1990, 1999	Ukraine	1996, 1999, 2006
Israel	2001	United Kingdom	1981, 1990, 1998, 1999, 2005
Italy	1981, 1990, 1999, 2005	United States	1982, 1990, 1995, 1999, 2006
Japan	1981, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005	Uruguay	1996, 2006
Jordan	2001, 2007	Venezuela	1996, 2000
Latvia	1990, 1996, 1999	Zambia	2007
Lithuania	1990, 1997, 1999		

†For Germany, the 1981 sample refers only to the German Federal Republic.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the main independent variables in the study

	Income inequality	Party polarization	GDP per capita	Educational inequality
Valid N	214.0	146.0	206.0	204.0
Mean	34.55	232.78	15553.11	0.27
S.D.	10.29	217.36	11295.26	0.12
Median	31.66	161.56	12021.89	0.25
Minimum	16.88	0.0	750.82	0.11
Maximum	76.29	1105.32	57097.78	0.79
Range	59.41	1105.32	56346.96	0.68
Skew	0.76	1.59	0.69	1.46
Kurtosis	0.23	2.89	-0.12	2.66

Table 3: Correlation between the standard deviation of Left-Right self-placement and various measures of income inequality

	Correlation	Lower bound of CI	Upper bound of CI	N
Gini index of inequality	0.45***	0.34	0.56	205
Top 10 share of income	-0.39**	-0.60	-0.13	52
Top 5 share of income	-0.35*	-0.57	-0.07	49
Top 1 share of income	0.08	-0.19	0.33	58
Top 0.5 share of income	-0.06	-0.32	0.20	56
Top 0.1 share of income	-0.08	-0.34	0.19	55

Note: As a result of spotty data coverage, the share of income was only available for a select number of countries, mainly OECD members. The Gini index was obtained from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database, version 4.0, which covers a wider range of countries. The correspondence between symbols and levels of significance is the following: '***' $p<.001$ '**' $p<.01$ '*' $p<.05$. Significance tests are imprecise, as observations are clustered (e.g. United States 1990, United States 1995, United States 1999 etc.)

Table 4: Variance in attitude distributions and income inequality

	Variable	Correlation	Lower bound of CI	Upper bound of CI	N
Variance in attitude regarding the desirability of more income equality	Gini index	0.40***	0.27	0.51	185
	Top 10 share	0.01	-0.31	0.34	37
	Top 5 share	0.05	-0.29	0.38	35
	Top 1 share	0.27	-0.03	0.53	43
	Top 0.5 share	0.19	-0.12	0.47	41
	Top 0.1 share	0.16	-0.16	0.45	40
Variance in attitude regarding the desirability of increased government ownership of businesses	Gini index	0.50***	0.39	0.61	177
	Top 10 share	0.09	-0.24	0.4	38
	Top 5 share	0.16	-0.17	0.47	36
	Top 1 share	0.47**	0.20	0.67	44
	Top 0.5 share	0.35*	0.05	0.59	42
	Top 0.1 share	0.30	-0.01	0.56	41
Variance in attitude regarding the desirability of increased government responsibility in providing for basic needs	Gini index	0.52***	0.41	0.62	192
	Top 10 share	0.42**	0.13	0.65	40
	Top 5 share	0.47**	0.18	0.69	38
	Top 1 share	0.56***	0.32	0.73	46
	Top 0.5 share	0.46**	0.18	0.66	44
	Top 0.1 share	0.42**	0.14	0.64	43

Note: Data coverage issues reduce the size of the sample for analyses which use the share of income which go to subgroups in the population. The correspondence between symbols and levels of significance is the following: '***' $p<.001$ '**' $p<.01$ '*' $p<.05$. Significance tests are imprecise given that observations are clustered.

Table 5: Kurtosis of attitude distributions and measures of income inequality

	Variable	Correlation	Lower bound of CI	Upper bound of CI	N
Kurtosis of Left-Right self-placement	Gini index	-0.24**	-0.37	-0.11	205
	Top 10 share	0.56***	0.34	0.72	52
	Top 5 share	0.53***	0.29	0.71	49
	Top 1 share	0.17	-0.09	0.41	58
	Top 0.5 share	0.25	-0.01	0.48	56
	Top 0.1 share	0.25	-0.01	0.49	55
Kurtosis of attitude regarding the desirability of more income equality	Gini index	-0.09	-0.23	0.06	185
	Top 10 share	0.23	-0.10	0.52	37
	Top 5 share	0.19	-0.15	0.5	35
	Top 1 share	-0.01	-0.31	0.29	43
	Top 0.5 share	-0.01	-0.31	0.3	41
	Top 0.1 share	0.01	-0.30	0.32	40
Kurtosis of attitude regarding the desirability of increased government ownership of businesses	Gini index	-0.47***	-0.58	-0.35	177
	Top 10 share	0.29	-0.03	0.56	38
	Top 5 share	0.22	-0.12	0.51	36
	Top 1 share	-0.19	-0.46	0.12	44
	Top 0.5 share	-0.05	-0.35	0.25	42
	Top 0.1 share	-0.02	-0.33	0.29	41
Kurtosis of attitude regarding the desirability of increased government responsibility in providing for basic needs	Gini index	-0.32***	-0.44	-0.18	192
	Top 10 share	-0.22	-0.5	0.09	40
	Top 5 share	-0.25	-0.53	0.07	38
	Top 1 share	-0.37*	-0.6	-0.09	46
	Top 0.5 share	-0.27	-0.52	0.03	44
	Top 0.1 share	-0.22	-0.49	0.09	43

Note: Data coverage issues reduce the size of the sample for analyses which use the share of income which go to subgroups in the population. The correspondence between symbols and levels of significance is the following: '***' p<.001 '**' p<.01 '*' p<.05. Significance tests are imprecise given that observations are clustered.

Table 6: Multilevel regression estimates for models predicting the standard deviation, kurtosis, and intraclass correlation coefficient for Left-Right self-placement

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.
				STANDARD DEVIATION				
Intercept	1.7052***	(0.1172)	1.9348***	(0.1648)	1.9418***	(0.3111)	2.1491***	(0.1578)
Income inequality	0.0141***	(0.0031)	0.0126***	(0.0040)	0.0119*	(0.0046)	0.0072*	(0.0035)
Party polarization			−0.0233	(0.0163)	−0.0164	(0.0172)		
GDP per capita /1000			−0.0074**	(0.0029)	−0.0069	(0.0051)	−0.0186*	(0.0046)
Educational inequality					0.0181	(0.1141)		
Democratic stability					−0.0002	(0.0013)	0.0020	(0.0012)
Intercept SD	0.3055		0.1733		0.1804		0.2656	
Residual SD	0.1795		0.1491		0.1483		0.1791	
AIC	41.7687		-49.2193		-41.4031		26.6461	
BIC	55.0607		-31.6994		-18.5246		46.4060	
logLik	-16.8843		30.6096		28.7015		-7.3231	
Countries	77		47		42		73	
Country years	205		137		129		199	
				KURTOSIS				
Intercept	0.4118*	(0.1913)	0.2984	(0.3972)	0.0397	(0.7378)	0.1124	(0.2797)
Income inequality	−0.0153**	(0.0051)	−0.0169†	(0.0093)	−0.0116	(0.0108)	−0.0101	(0.0061)
Party polarization			0.0408	(0.0372)	0.0310	(0.0392)		
GDP per capita /1000			0.0009	(0.0070)	0.0073	(0.0122)	0.0185*	(0.0081)
Educational inequality					−0.0690	(0.2793)		
Democratic stability					−0.0021	(0.0031)	−0.0046*	(0.0022)
Intercept SD	0.4593		0.4369		0.4510		0.4533	
Residual SD	0.3410		0.3347		0.3353		0.3400	
AIC	276.2843		180.9242		176.0021		269.0830	
BIC	289.5763		198.4440		198.8806		288.8428	

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	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.
logLik	-134.1421		-84.4621		-80.0011		-128.5415	
Countries	77		47		42		73	
Country years	205		137		129		199	

					ICC			
Intercept	0.0025	(0.0086)	0.0046	(0.0148)	−0.0007	(0.0264)	0.0148	(0.0130)
Income inequality	0.0004†	(0.0002)	0.0000	(0.0003)	0.0001	(0.0004)	0.0002	(0.0003)
Party polarization			0.0029†	(0.0016)	0.0029	(0.0017)		
GDP per capita /1000			−0.0003	(0.0002)	−0.0004	(0.0004)	−0.0004	(0.0004)
Educational inequality					−0.0037	(0.0090)		
Democratic stability					0.0000	(0.0001)	0.0000	(0.0001)
Intercept SD	0.0193		0.0123		0.0126		0.0194	
Residual SD	0.0157		0.0151		0.0154		0.0159	
AIC	-950.5396		-673.1308		-624.5056		-915.4729	
BIC	-937.4272		-655.834		-601.9433		-895.9907	
logLik	479.2698		342.5654		320.2528		463.7364	
Countries	77		47		42		73	
Country years	196		132		124		190	

[a] '***' $p < .001$; '**' $p < 0.1$; '*' $p < .05$; '$\dagger$' $p < .1$. Each regression model was run with 100 plausible values for the Gini index of income inequality; estimates were subsequently pooled.

[b] The model fit statistics presented (AIC, BIC and loglikelihood) were obtained by averaging the 100 different values obtained from the regressions.

Table 7: Multilevel regression estimates for models predicting the standard deviation, kurtosis, and intraclass correlation coefficient for attitude toward income equality

	(1) Est.	(1) S.E.	(2) Est.	(2) S.E.	(3) Est.	(3) S.E.	(4) Est.	(4) S.E.
				STANDARD DEVIATION				
Intercept	2.3711***	(0.1194)	2.6423***	(0.1937)	3.2569***	(0.3020)	2.6340***	(0.1618)
Income inequality	0.0114***	(0.0032)	0.0097*	(0.0045)	0.0090*	(0.0046)	0.0073*	(0.0036)
Party polarization			−0.0230	(0.0220)	−0.0335	(0.0228)		
GDP per capita /1000			−0.0065*	(0.0031)	−0.0095†	(0.0049)	−0.0112*	(0.0048)
Educational inequality					0.2936**	(0.0983)		
Democratic stability					−0.0003	(0.0013)	0.0013	(0.0015)
Intercept SD	0.2699		0.1420		0.1009		0.2478	
Residual SD	0.2273		0.2099		0.2130		0.2297	
AIC	91.6037		13.6126		7.0214		87.1112	
BIC	104.4852		30.0822		28.4040		106.2689	
logLik	-41.8019		-0.8063		4.4893		-37.5556	
Countries	77		46		41		74	
Country years	185		115		107		180	
				KURTOSIS				
Intercept	−0.5680**	(0.1948)	−0.5486†	(0.3122)	−1.8419*	(0.4978)	−0.5440†	(0.2855)
Income inequality	−0.0045	(0.0053)	−0.0114	(0.0070)	−0.0043	(0.0073)	−0.0045	(0.0063)
Party polarization			0.0105	(0.0413)	0.0283	(0.0423)		
GDP per capita /1000			0.0024	(0.0049)	0.0134†	(0.0080)	0.0053	(0.0085)
Educational inequality					−0.5488***	(0.1551)		
Democratic stability					−0.0023	(0.0021)	−0.0032	(0.0016)
Intercept SD	0.3198		0.1096		0.0000		0.3184	
Residual SD	0.5304		0.4417		0.4313		0.5290	
AIC	344.5877		157.1705		139.6647		338.4126	
BIC	357.4691		173.6401		161.0473		357.5703	

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	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.
logLik	-168.2939		-72.5853		-61.8323		-163.2063	
Countries	77		46		41		74	
Country years	185		115		107		180	
				ICC				
Intercept	0.0641***	(0.0126)	0.0844***	(0.0249)	0.1212**	(0.0411)	0.0863***	(0.0189)
Income inequality	−0.0007*	(0.0003)	−0.0016**	(0.0006)	−0.0018**	(0.0006)	−0.0011**	(0.0004)
Party polarization			0.0051†	(0.0030)	0.0038	(0.0031)		
GDP per capita /1000			−0.0009*	(0.0004)	−0.0007	(0.0007)	−0.0009†	(0.0006)
Educational inequality					0.0149	(0.0133)		
Democratic stability					−0.0001	(0.0002)	0.0002	(0.0002)
Intercept SD	0.0163		0.0167		0.0136		0.0176	
Residual SD	0.0387		0.0289		0.0293		0.0384	
AIC	-622.9704		-438.9179		-407.3018		-600.8223	
BIC	-610.2209		-422.6070		-386.1466		-581.8679	
logLik	315.4852		225.4590		211.6509		306.4111	
Countries	77		46		41		74	
Country years	179		112		104		174	

[a] '***' p < .001; '**' p < 0.1; '*' p < .05; '†' p < .1. Each regression model was run with 100 plausible values for the Gini index of income inequality; estimates were subsequently pooled.

[b] The model fit statistics presented (AIC, BIC and loglikelihood) were obtained by averaging the 100 different values obtained from the regressions.

Table 8: Multilevel regression estimates for models predicting the standard deviation, kurtosis, and intraclass correlation coefficient for attitude toward government ownership of business

	(1) Est.	(1) S.E.	(2) Est.	(2) S.E.	(3) Est.	(3) S.E.	(4) Est.	(4) S.E.
				STANDARD DEVIATION				
Intercept	2.0864***	(0.1332)	2.5543***	(0.1656)	2.6254***	(0.3041)	2.7369***	(0.1490)
Income inequality	0.0156***	(0.0035)	0.0098*	(0.0039)	0.0109*	(0.0046)	0.0071*	(0.0033)
Party polarization			0.0178	(0.0190)	0.0126	(0.0207)		
GDP per capita /1000			−0.0265***	(0.0030)	−0.0243***	(0.0055)	−0.0250***	(0.0046)
Educational inequality					0.0455	(0.0993)		
Democratic stability					−0.0011	(0.0013)	−0.0006	(0.0013)
Intercept SD	0.3281		0.1274		0.1286		0.2123	
Residual SD	0.2149		0.1693		0.1718		0.2145	
AIC	96.7667		-28.0706		-19.2630		52.3901	
BIC	109.4713		-11.9778		1.5784		71.2751	
logLik	-44.3834		20.0353		17.6315		-20.1951	
Countries	75		44		39		72	
Country years	177		108		100		172	
				KURTOSIS				
Intercept	0.2851	(0.1735)	−0.4616	(0.2942)	−0.2270	(0.5470)	−0.5882**	(0.1951)
Income inequality	−0.0257***	(0.0046)	−0.0180**	(0.0069)	−0.0218**	(0.0083)	−0.0130**	(0.0043)
Party polarization			−0.0141	(0.0323)	−0.0109	(0.0355)		
GDP per capita /1000			0.0369***	(0.0054)	0.0314***	(0.0101)	0.0265***	(0.0060)
Educational inequality					0.0871	(0.1840)		
Democratic stability					0.0024	(0.0024)	0.0026	(0.0017)
Intercept SD	0.3958		0.2555		0.2593		0.2389	
Residual SD	0.3231		0.2783		0.2862		0.3271	
AIC	215.4514		89.0866		91.3584		171.5137	
BIC	228.1560		105.1794		112.1997		190.3986	

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	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.
logLik	-103.7257		-38.5433		-37.6792		-79.7568	
Countries	75		44		39		72	
Country years	177		108		100		172	

				ICC				
Intercept	0.0114	(0.0107)	0.0404*	(0.0186)	0.0339	(0.0339)	0.0441**	(0.0148)
Income inequality	0.0006†	(0.0003)	−0.0002	(0.0004)	0.0000	(0.0005)	0.0000	(0.0003)
Party polarization			0.0065*	(0.0026)	0.0057*	(0.0029)		
GDP per capita /1000			−0.0020***	(0.0003)	−0.0022***	(0.0006)	−0.0009†	(0.0005)
Educational inequality					−0.0063	(0.0103)		
Democratic stability					0.0000	(0.0001)	−0.0001	(0.0001)
Intercept SD	0.0156		0.0000		0.0000		0.0106	
Residual SD	0.0304		0.0273		0.0275		0.0314	
AIC	-663.8053		-441.6211		-401.6523		-645.3541	
BIC	-651.2622		-425.7548		-381.1375		-626.7184	
logLik	335.9027		226.8106		208.8262		328.6770	
Countries	75		44		39		72	
Country years	170		104		96		165	

[a] '***' $p < .001$; '**' $p < 0.1$; '*' $p < .05$; '†' $p < .1$. Each regression model was run with 100 plausible values for the Gini index of income inequality; estimates were subsequently pooled.

[b] The model fit statistics presented (AIC, BIC and loglikelihood) were obtained by averaging the 100 different values obtained from the regressions.

Table 9: Multilevel regression estimates for models predicting the standard deviation, kurtosis, and intraclass correlation coefficient for attitude toward government responsibility in providing for the basic needs of citizens

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.
	STANDARD DEVIATION							
Intercept	2.2833***	(0.1028)	2.7408***	(0.1796)	2.9954***	(0.3232)	2.6281***	(0.1398)
Income inequality	0.0140***	(0.0028)	0.0033	(0.0043)	0.0033	(0.0050)	0.0088**	(0.0031)
Party polarization			−0.0033	(0.0194)	−0.0064	(0.0210)		
GDP per capita /1000			−0.0096***	(0.0029)	−0.0081	(0.0053)	−0.0102**	(0.0041)
Educational inequality					0.1458	(0.1087)		
Democratic stability					−0.0011	(0.0014)	−0.0006	(0.0013)
Intercept SD	0.2154		0.1420		0.1457		0.1958	
Residual SD	0.2185		0.1837		0.1848		0.2154	
AIC	57.7851		-11.8383		-4.6739		48.2037	
BIC	70.8150		4.9858		17.2157		67.5904	
logLik	-24.8925		11.9192		10.3369		-18.1019	
Countries	78		47		42		75	
Country years	192		122		114		187	
	KURTOSIS							
Intercept	−0.3577**	(0.1473)	−0.9698**	(0.3408)	−1.5594**	(0.5981)	−0.6068**	(0.2112)
Income inequality	−0.0125**	(0.0040)	0.0041	(0.0080)	0.0061	(0.0092)	−0.0088†	(0.0047)
Party polarization			0.0044	(0.0376)	0.0126	(0.0398)		
GDP per capita /1000			0.0082	(0.0055)	0.0138	(0.0098)	0.0055	(0.0062)
Educational inequality					−0.2427	(0.1989)		
Democratic stability					−0.0004	(0.0026)	0.0013	(0.0019)
Intercept SD	0.2745		0.2606		0.2592		0.2645	
Residual SD	0.3602		0.3601		0.3550		0.3608	
AIC	226.8802		148.2852		140.1768		222.8737	
BIC	239.9101		165.1094		162.0664		242.2604	

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	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.
logLik	-109.4401		-68.1426		-62.0884		-105.4369	
Countries	78		47		42		75	
Country years	192		122		114		187	

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				ICC				
Intercept	0.0210*	(0.0102)	0.0354*	(0.0150)	0.0222	(0.0269)	0.0416*	(0.0151)
Income inequality	0.0001	(0.0003)	−0.0004	(0.0003)	−0.0003	(0.0004)	−0.0002	(0.0003)
Party polarization			0.0024	(0.0020)	0.0022	(0.0021)		
GDP per capita /1000			−0.0005*	(0.0002)	−0.0006	(0.0004)	−0.0009†	(0.0004)
Educational inequality					−0.0071	(0.0085)		
Democratic stability					0.0000	(0.0001)	0.0002	(0.0001)
Intercept SD	0.0126		0.0074		0.0075		0.0121	
Residual SD	0.0322		0.0206		0.0205		0.0323	
AIC	-714.7675		-557.7636		-515.6492		-691.3615	
BIC	-701.8861		-541.1395		-494.0453		-672.2037	
logLik	361.3837		284.8818		265.8246		351.6807	
Countries	78		47		42		75	
Country years	185		118		110		180	

[a] '***' $p < .001$; '**' $p < 0.1$; '*' $p < .05$; '†' $p < .1$. Each regression model was run with 100 plausible values for the Gini index of income inequality; estimates were subsequently pooled.

[b] The model fit statistics presented (AIC, BIC and loglikelihood) were obtained by averaging the 100 different values obtained from the regressions.

Table 10: Multilevel regression estimates for models predicting the degree of constraint between economic attitudes

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.
				CRONBACH'S α				
Intercept	0.6301***	(0.0486)	0.5548***	(0.0929)	0.4048**	(0.1426)	0.6694***	(0.0683)
Income inequality	−0.0069***	(0.0013)	−0.0058**	(0.0022)	−0.0035†	(0.0022)	−0.0077***	(0.0015)
Party polarization			0.0122	(0.0104)	0.0101	(0.0104)		
GDP per capita /1000			−0.0003	(0.0015)	−0.0008	(0.0023)	−0.0023	(0.0020)
Educational inequality					−0.0763†	(0.0468)		
Democratic stability					−0.0001	(0.0006)	0.0008	(0.0006)
Intercept SD	0.0899		0.0703		0.0533		0.0853	
Residual SD	0.1111		0.0984		0.0944		0.1116	
AIC	-193.5168		-153.9377		-154.9336		-186.8420	
BIC	-180.9502		-137.6805		-133.8557		-168.1701	
logLik	100.7584		82.9689		85.4668		99.4210	
Countries	72		46		41		69	
Country years	171		111		103		166	

[a] '***' $p < .001$; '**' $p < 0.1$; '*' $p < .05$; '†' $p < .1$. Each regression model was run with 100 plausible values for the Gini index of income inequality; estimates were subsequently pooled.

[b] The model fit statistics presented (AIC, BIC and loglikelihood) were obtained by averaging the 100 different values obtained from the regressions.

[c] The attitudes concern the desirability of increased income equality, of increased government ownership of business, and of increased government responsibility in providing for the basic needs of citizens.

Table 11: Multilevel regression estimates for models predicting income inequality

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
(Intercept)	18.6247***	18.2711*	27.1585**	23.9960**	11.0927	40.7108***	31.6174***	35.8944***
	(2.3297)	(7.6836)	(9.4523)	(9.4409)	(14.5572)	(11.0922)	(4.9266)	(4.6902)
Children (% population)	0.1218*	0.3030†	0.4083*	0.4291*	0.6162†	−0.1273	0.0911	0.0608
	(0.0532)	(0.1737)	(0.2078)	(0.2039)	(0.3560)	(0.2237)	(0.1149)	(0.1140)
Elderly (% population)	0.6906***	0.6716**	0.9087***	0.8817***	0.8768*	−0.0214	−0.3485	−0.3255
	(0.0910)	(0.2098)	(0.2125)	(0.2127)	(0.3991)	(0.3420)	(0.2209)	(0.1994)
GDP per capita		0.0001†	0.0002***	0.0002*	0.0000	0.0001	0.0001*	0.0000
		(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Women (% labor force)		−0.0914	−0.3970*	−0.3711*	−0.1533	−0.2657		
		(0.1211)	(0.1554)	(0.1530)	(0.2559)	(0.1772)		
Agriculture (% labor force)		0.0176						
		(0.0623)						
Net FDI		0.0007						
		(0.0009)						
Union density			−0.0761*	−0.0790**	−0.0850*			−0.1193***
			(0.0306)	(0.0303)	(0.0406)			(0.0187)
Left cumulative power			−0.2004**	−0.1910**	−0.1653†			
			(0.0694)	(0.0684)	(0.0878)			
Educational inequality				−1.6968	−3.4071	−2.0198		
				(1.6128)	(2.5114)	(2.0258)		
Party polarization					0.0505	−0.0232	−0.0729	0.1302
					(0.4320)	(0.2534)	(0.2211)	(0.2125)
Intercept SD	6.2035	6.1661	3.3902	3.2115	2.9498	6.2326	5.5266	4.6811
Residual SD	3.9596	2.4582	1.1451	1.1491	1.4192	2.2057	3.1602	2.5490

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	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	(Continued from previous page)							
AIC	10450.9722	3088.0491	735.8624	733.6980	268.0763	915.3182	1940.3828	1391.8624
BIC	10478.5244	3127.7702	765.3194	766.4280	289.5399	943.3261	1967.2469	1420.4700
logLik	−5220.4861	−1535.0245	−358.9312	−356.8490	−123.0381	−448.6591	−963.1914	−687.9312
Countries	51	48	19	19	19	44	48	37
Country years	1827	610	195	195	52	166	343	264

[a] '***' p < .001; '**' p < 0.1; '*' p < .05; '†' p < .1. Each regression model was run with 100 plausible values for the Gini index of income inequality; estimates were subsequently pooled.

[b] The model fit statistics presented (AIC, BIC and loglikelihood) were obtained by averaging the 100 different values obtained from the regressions.

[c] "Children" are defined as all individuals below 14 years old.

[d] "Elderly" are defined as all individuals above 65 years old.

Figure 1: Trends in aggregate Left-Right placement for OECD nations (smaller values denote a more Leftist tendency). Each line represents a linear trend for an individual country in the sample (with dots of the same color being the individual observations for the country)

Figure 2: Aggregate shifts in the self-reported preference for more or less income equality (higher values denote a more intense preference for income equality). Each line represents a linear trend for an individual country in the sample (with dots of the same color being individual observations for the country)

Figure 3: Trends in party polarization over time (RILE index; higher values denote a higher degree of party polarization). Each line represents a linear trend for an individual country in the sample (with dots of the same color being the individual observations for the country)

Figure 4: Trends in mass attitude polarization for Left-Right self-placement. Each line represents a linear trend for an individual country in the sample (with dots of the same color being the individual observations for the country)

**STANDARD DEVIATION OF LEFT-RIGHT
and income inequality**

Figure 5: Relationship between income inequality and political polarization (standard deviation of Left-Right self-placement). Shaded areas represent 95 percent confidence intervals for the estimates

Figure 6: Aggregate trends in the kurtosis of the distribution of Left-Right self-placement for the full sample. Shaded areas represent 95 percent confidence intervals for the estimates

Figure 7: Aggregate trends in the kurtosis of the distribution of the attitude toward income equality for the full sample. Shaded areas represent 95 percent confidence intervals for the estimates

Figure 8: Correlation between three attitudes for the OECD subsample (only countries with at least one valid correlation were included). Bands around the points represent 95 percent confidence intervals for the estimate