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Does ethnicity matter? An experimental study of Montenegrin voting behavior

-Thesis proposal-

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## Introduction

The end of the Cold War prompted a new wave of democratization in Europe. While this democratization wave inspired a body of literature in comparative politics dealing with differences and similarities between old and new democracies in institutional settings, constitutions, democratic values, electoral and party systems (see Crafword and Lijphart, 1995;Lijphart, 2001; Tavits, 2005, 2008; Zielinsky, 2002) literature on ethnic voting in new democracies is scarce(see Birch 1995). This is especially true when we consider the analysis of voting behavior in the countries of former Yugoslavia. The question that arises is whether there are differences in voting behavior patterns is old democracies and West Balkan countries?

As a starting point this study will use cleavage theory established by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). The "fourth wave" of democratization renewed interest in this theory with a focus on the influence of cleavage politics on the establishment and durability of party systems (see Tavits, 2005; Birnir, 2007, Tucker, 2002). In the review of all articles published on the topic of electoral dynamics in post – communist Europe in the period from 1991 to 2000

Tucker(2002), states that in principle authors who use cleavage theory agree on the existence and influence of societal cleavages on voting patterns and electoral results. Where differences arise is identification of particular cleavages where authors mostly focus on class, urban rural splits and generational effect (Kopstein & Richter 1992; Clem & Craumer 1995c, 1997; Wyman et al. 1995;Szelenyi et al. 1997; Moser 1999b, in Tucker, 2002). Particularly interesting for the topic of this paper is that only one work specifically focuses on the influence of ethnic cleavage on voting patterns and electoral results(Birch 1995, in Tucker, 2002). Furthermore, presumably because of the undemocratic character of the Western Balkan states and a prolonged period of war and ethnic conflict in 1990s, these countries were largely excluded from comparative analyses of post-communist countries(see Tavits, 2005; McAllister and White, 2007; Whitefield, 2002; Evans and Whitefield, 2000). Tucker(2002) ads that case selection is influenced mainly buy the sphere of interest of Western democracies resulting in Russia, Poland, Baltic countries and new and potential NATO member states being analyzed more frequently. In this study, I will focus more on the cleavage politics as explanation of voting patterns and small rate of electoral volatility in the case of Montenegro. Aim of the research is to analyze whether explanation for low electoral volatility can be found in strong ethnic party/voter linkage and analyze its strength under the conditions of candidate's misbehavior (see Peters and Welch, 1980; Redlawsk and McCann, 2005). When confronted with information about candidates' corruption, how do voters weight candidate's ethnicity and his/her misbehavior in deciding the vote? For this exploration I will use an experimental design that largely follows Dunning and Harrison (2010) study of ethnic politics in Mali, with an additional stage where informationis provided about corrupt behavior.

Studying the Montenegrin case is interesting for several reasons. First, Montenegro is a democracy in the making that can provide further insight in the party system development and cleavage-based voting in a recently formed post-communist country. Furthermore, Wolfinger (1965) argued that ethnic based voting is strongest in the early years of residence. Since to my knowledge there is no data on this issue for Montenegrin case, this analysis can provide data for the early residence in Montenegro. Few remarks should be

pointed out here. In his analysis Wolfinger (1965) studied early residence of social groups that have moved in already long existing countries. Although this is not the case in Montenegro it is my belief that this concept can be applied. The fact that Montenegro become independent in 2006 (after 88 years) when all social groups started redefining their identity is an argument that could be made in considering all social groups can in a way as early residents.

Second, in her analysis on the stability of party systems in East Europe, Tavits (2005) examines the level of electoral volatility and party system stability. One of the main arguments is that high level of electoral volatility and low party system stability is a consequence of a weak cleavage structure which ensured the emergence of economic voting pattern (Tavits, 2005). From this perspective Montenegrin case is interesting as it represent an outlier case with a strong cleavage structure, very low electoral volatility and a stable party system. If Tavits' reasoning is correct then Montenegrin voting behavior should be unresponsive to stimuli like differences in perceived competence in economic managementor corruption among politicians.

Third, studying ethnic cleavage voting can help us understand why Montenegro has a multi-party system with a predominant party (Komar, 2013) that never lost national elections since the introduction of pluralism in 1991.

Lastly, this study can also have practical relevance. It can provide information to political parties whether electoral campaigning on ethnic issues is politically profitable strategy. Furthermore, prior to this study only Komar (2013) analyzed the patterns of voting behavior in Montenegro in her PhD thesis. This study was an exploratory research in which she combined and applied a large number of well-established voting behavior theories without specifically focusing on either of them. My study is actually the first attempt of looking at ethic cleavage as a main factor in explaining voting behavior in Montenegro.

## **Short Case History**

To understand the origins of voting behavior in contemporary Montenegrin society, we must first trace back its origins in the short but turbulent Montenegrin political history. Note that the historical events that I'm about to describe and their competing interpretations were used as political arguments during post-communist period, and produced the main line of division on the question of Montenegrin sovereignty in the referendum in 2006.

In the modern era, Montenegro was finally acknowledged as a sovereign and independent state on Berlin congress in 1878. The period of independence lasted for almost 30 years. Montenegro was forcefully annexed and incorporated by Serbia into the Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes(SHS Kingdom) in 1918 (Vuković, 1918). The course of events that took place in the unification assembly, called the Great People's Assembly, represent the first and probably the strongest source of a strong and persistent cleavage in Montenegro along ethnic lines.

What were the reasons behind these political controversies? Morrison (2009) points out that what makes the situation more unusual is the cultural similarity between Montenegrins and Serbs. Both people share Orthodox religion, very similar myths and symbols while the language differences are very minor (Morrison, 2009). Furthermore, the idea of the first Yugoslav state was present for several years and the majority of the population supported the creation of the joint Yugoslav state. Vuković (2015) rightfully argues that the support for the joint state was based on a belief that the unification process will respect Montenegrin sovereignty and be based on the principles of equality. Even Montenegrin King Nikola I Petrović, whose political views often changed, supported the unification within a loose federal state with federal units that will preserve autonomy (Pavlović, 2009).

Instead of following the outlined principles, the unification was conducted in a completely different manner. In summary follows the argument and historical depiction of what happened made by Šuković(2011). In November 1918, while King Nikola I and Montenegrin government were still in exile, the Serbian military organized a Great People's Assembly (further in the text Assembly) in Podgorica<sup>1</sup>. The Assembly was established by and Act made in small town Berane 10 days prior to the Assembly being organized in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Additional argument agains the legality and legitimacy of the Great People's Assembly is the fact that it wasn't organized in Royal Capitol Cetinje, which served as a center of Montenegrin state for more than two centuries.

Podgorica. In the Act rules of procedure on the elections of peoples representatives on the Assembly were laid out. With the support of Serbian military election for the Assembly were held in a rush without the majority of the people knowing about them. In addition, in a significant part of Montenegro they were not organized at all. As the Assembly was established "representatives"<sup>2</sup> on the first days voted on the rules of procedure that will be used for the decision making process. On the second day, the Chairman Savo Cerović introduced the Draft of the resolution on the Agenda without anyone knowing about it. It was read once without distribution of the printed copies to the "representatives". Furthermore, Chairman denied discussion both on the specificities and in general about the content of the Draft claiming that the applause herd after the reading is proof enough that discussion is unnecessary. There is evidence to be found in the transcript of the meeting that significant demand for debate and opposition to claiming the applause as evidence that the Draft has been accepted as Resolution and consequently passed but no proper voting ever took place. Despite all that all 160 representatives signed the Resolution (Šuković, 2011). As the rules of procedure were completely ignored it resulted in Serbian military literally proclaiming unconditional unification of Montenegro to Serbia and nullification of the Montenegrin state. The main decisions of the Assembly were the nullification of the Montenegrin state and church (Morrison, 2009) and prohibition onreturn to the countryto KingNikola I whoremained exilein Parisuntil his deathin 1921. As Rastoder (2003) points out, the whole process was both illegitimate and illegal (cited in Bieber, 2003).

As it became more and more obvious that equal status will not be granted to Montenegrins, a military resistance was organized and took place on Christmas Eve 1918 (Rastoder, 2003, in Bieber, 2003). The military fractions called "komite" were definitely defeated in 1919and the remaining of the force scattered around the country later on joining the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the opposing political groups were formally organized into the proponents of unconditional unification called "The Whites", and the proponents of the unification on equal footing called "The Greens" (Rastoder, 2003 in Džankić, 2013). This line of cleavage remained frozen during the Communist era but resurfaced and is still used for politicization of ethnic identity in contemporary Montenegro (Vuković, 2015). In

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> [Italic, N.S].

Montenegrin society two historical narratives on the 1918 unification are present. On the one hand, in contemporary Montenegrin society Montenegrins view unification as illegal and illegitimate and as the result of the Serbian aggressor politics. On the other hand, Serbs view the 1918 unification as a free expression of the people's will as Montenegrins are colloquially called "southern Serbs". These narratives organized along the historical confrontation between The Greens and The Whites helped establish the identities associated with pro-independence or unionist block (Morrison, 2009). The confronted discourses are just one dimension of what today shapes the political identities of Montenegrins and Serbs.

The Montenegrin state was re-established after WWII but not as an independent state but as one of the federal units of Yugoslavia. This was a significant improvement over the position Montenegro had in the SHS Kingdom. At that point even highly positioned people within the Central Committee of the Communist Party argued that Montenegro deserves the status of a separate republic but not of a separate nation (Đilas, 1947 in Džankić, 2013). Relatively good position of the Montenegrin state lasted until the bloody dissolution of Yugoslavia when Montenegro decided to stay in a joint state with Serbia.

It is precisely at this point that the ethnic cleavage remerged and is still shaping the face of Montenegrin politics. Vuković (2015) argued that the pressure of the Milosevic's regime created an opening for the re-emergence of the unsettled Montenegrin question that seemed to be resolved for good in the communist era<sup>3</sup>. The ethnic clashes remerged again in the relations between official Podgorica and official Belgrade, where the argument of Montenegrin nation being a historical fabrication and nothing more than southern Serbia resurfaced (Morrison, 2003 in Vuković, 2015). The clashes between two federal units alongside with the rising ethnic and religious conflicts in the region created a path for the emergence of numerous political subjects claiming to represent different ethnic entities.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Note that this issue was pressent prior to the clases of 1997-1998. LSCG (Liberal Union of Montenegro) advocated the seccision of Montenegro, but only after the DPS monopolized the issue it became higly politically salient in domestic politics and in the relationship with Serbia.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> After the deterrence from Milošević's nationalist politics, the political clashes between Podgorica and Belgrade culminated on the 14<sup>th</sup> of January, 1998 when in mass demonstrations in Podgorica, police and

Džankić (2013) points out that precisely this mobilization along ethnic lines made possible the creation of Montenegrin and Serb identity. Džankić (2013) acknowledges the prior existence of religious and linguistic differences but in her opinion these divides were not that influential per se, just created additional layers of Montenegrin or Serbian identity and contributed to the dominance of structural (ethno-cultural) cleavages. For the delimitation of Montenegrin and Serbian political identities, the single most important event, according to Džankić (2013), was the break in the ruling party in 1997 when two fractions reemerged: one fostering the values associated with Montenegrin identity pushing for independence, other nurturing strong relations with the Milosevic's regime in Belgrade and "preserving"Serbian identity (Vuković, 2015). The clash between these two opposing political programs would reach its peak in the Montenegrin referendum for independence in 2006.

From 1997 to 2002 the independent block grew in strength and general support which eventually resulted in the signing of the document between the governments of Serbia and Montenegro known as Belgrade Agreement (Darmanović, 2007). The main provisions of the Charter referred to creation of a more loose joint state with a separated foreign policy.

From that moment on Montenegro and Serbia started appearing in the international community as practically two independent states (Đurović, 2006). Two states separately negotiated the accession to the World Trading Organization and filled separate accession applications for EU (Đurović, 2006). Regarding the independence issue, the most important provision ("temporality clause") stated the right of the Montenegrin people to organize a referendum for independence 3 years after the signing of the Agreement (Darmanović, 2007).

Due to the much politicized issue of independence, and bearing in mind the recent history of the Balkans, the EU took part in the negotiation and organization process of the referendum through special emissary Miroslav Lajčak and Františep Lipka (Darmanović, 2007). The later took part in the referendum as the chair of the electoral commission

military confronted. At that point, police was controlled by the Montenegrin government while the military was controlled by the regime in Belgrade.

(Darmanović, 2007). In order to avoid further complication of the strained relations of the two countries, a majority of 55% who voted in the referendum was needed for Montenegro to become an independent state. On May 21<sup>st</sup> 2006, Montenegrin voters went to the pools and with arazor thin 55,1% majority decided to become an independent state.

In her analysis of the cleavage structure in Montenegro, Đžankić (2013) argues that four distinct critical junctures paved the way for the emerging cleavage structure. The last critical juncture was the 2006 referendum which adjoined both structural and functional cleavages<sup>5</sup> in Montenegro. Although functional (socio-economic) cleavages had gained in importance after the fall of Milošević in 2000, electoral results from the parliamentary elections in 2001 indicated the dominance of structural cleavages between the two camps. Functional cleavages have just for a brief period of time changed the dynamics of the competition in 1997 and 2006 (Džankić, 2013). In the political struggle over the statehood issue the clear division among the people became obvious only after the political actors triggered the structural (ethno-cultural) cleavages. Furthermore, the divide over the statehood issue ultimately lead to the reconstruction and reinvention of the national identities, where Montenegrins aligned with the pro-independence block while Serbs aligned with the unionist block (Džankić, 2013).

Although the statehood issue was resolved in 2006, the ethnic cleavage is still persistent 9 years later. The referendum resolved the statehood issue, but the conflict was preserved in the Montenegrin/Serb societal split (Bieber,2010; Darmanović,2007; in Moch'tak, 2015). There are several reasons why ethnicity remains an important factor.

First, the Serbian minority still has problems accepting the decision made 9 years ago. This opinion is supported by Serbian parties that haven't made a clear statement whether they accept the new political reality and with a small number of radical Serbian parties that still publicly support the initiative for a new unification.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> By the term functional cleavages Džankić (2013) reffers to political (class, optimal, socio-economic) split in Montenegrin society regarding the relationship whit Milošević's regime in Belgrade. After the 1997 split in the ruling party (DPS) to DPS (Democratic Party of Socialists) and SNP (Socialist Peoples Party), DPS opposed Milošević while newly formed SNP supported the regime in Belgrade. On the other hand, structural (socio cultural) cleavages are primarily societal splits along the lines of ethnicity, religion and language.

Second, after the referendum the state has undergone efforts to rebuild Montenegrin national identity. In the immediate years before and after the referenda these efforts were focused on the issues of state symbols such as the national flag and national anthem. In 2004, the Parliament of Montenegro passed the Law on national symbols defining new coat of arms and flag. Furthermore, the text of the new national anthem "O svijetla majska zoro" (Oh, the bright dawn of May) was contested (Džankić,2013). Significant opposition from the Serbian part was in place to the instalment of the symbols that are associated with the Montenegrin state from 1878-1918. The breaking up with the history "shared" with Serbia during the 90's and even during the communist era went further from dissociating Montenegro from Serbian in terms of national symbols, it even went to the point that even the "republic" was erased from the state name in the constitutionand regarded asan unwanted Yugoslav legacy.

In the recent years, the ethnic cleavage has been deepened with the establishment of the Montenegrin language. The process lasted for several years including the creation of two new letters, grammar of the Montenegrin language and the introduction of Montenegrin language into primary and secondary schools. Once again, the whole process was highly politicized and culminated in a month-long negotiations about the name of the language in schools and constitutional change in this regard. Serbian parties managed to force the Montenegrin majority into making concessions more or less blackmailing them with the withdrawal of support for constitutional change in the part of Judiciary proposed by the EU as a part of the accession process. As a specific request in the EU accession process, Montenegro was asked to change the Constitution to make Judiciary less dependent from other branches of power. Among other changes this implied change in the way members of the Judiciary and Prosecutorial Council were elected. In order to make Constitutional change a two third majority of all MPs is needed which ruling coalition didn't have at that time. Opposition parties struck a deal offering support for the changes in the Judiciary part if ruling coalition supports constitutional changes in language section. In the end, the language in schools was called "Mother tongue", with an optional clause for each student to choose the name of the language (Montenegrin, Serbian, Croat or Bosnian language). In the

constitutional sense, Montenegrin language was made an official language, while Serbia, Croatian, Bosnian and Albanian language were made languages in official use.

One other dimension that deepened the ethnic cleavage is the issue of the religious affiliation to Montenegrin or Serbian Orthodox Church. The 1918 annexation was the end of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church but several initiatives were present during the interwar years to reestablish it as a formal religious institution. Currently, the Montenegrin Orthodox Church exist as a religious organization without formal recognition from other Orthodox churches. This matter is highly delicate as the Serbian Orthodox Church is seen as a main actor through which Serbia can still influence political life in Montenegro. Resolving this issue is likely toround offthe processof buildingthe Montenegrinnational identity. So far the state hasn't made any concrete actions in supporting or opposing the reestablishment of this religious institution. Džankić (2013) argues that the ruling party restrain from clear affiliation with one or the other Orthodox Church has led to religious cleavage becoming a separate layer of identity: both Montenegrin and Serbian.

What are the implications of these political clashes on voting behavior? On the one hand, Mocht'ak (2015) argues that ethnicity plays an important role as a mobilization factor against the ruling DPS. On the other hand, this does not imply that ethnicity is very important in the electoral contest. It is the goal of this paper to provide evidence on this unexplored matter. Although and argument could be made that this party-voter link cannot be as strong as in the early years after the 2006 referendum, the very low level of electoral volatility indicates that there is a strong stabilizing factor in the vote choice. I argue that this stabilizing factor could be an ethnic cleavage complemented with religious and language cleavages, or what Džankić (2013) called the structural (ethno-cultural) cleavage.

## **Theoretical consideration**

How do voters decide? More specifically are there any social characteristics that can help us understand voting behavior and party linkage? According to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), party system polarization is based on social group polarization in which only few hierarchically ordered cleavages matter. According to their analysis, social conflicts based on religion, class, ethnicity are reflected trough party systems and are expressed through voting behavior. Evidence can be found that ethnic issue represents a particularly persistent social cleavage that significantly affects influence voting preferences (see Hahn and Almy, 1971; Parenti, 1967). Contrary to this view, Lijphart (1980) argues that surprisingly religious and linguistic cleavages are effective predictors in vote choice. What his study also shows is that in countries such as Canada and Belgium religious cleavage was taking over the ethnic-linguistic differences which have dominated the 1970s.

On the one hand, more recent research provides evidence that traditional social cleavages have become a weaker predictor of electoral choice. Dalton (1996) argues that this is especially true for advanced industrial democracies. The reasoning behind the argument is that due to the change in electoral competition and party politics, traditional cleavages have become less relevant cues and information shortcuts in advanced industrial societies (Dalton, 1996).On the other hand, this claim has been challenged in a series of published articles (see, Tucker, 2002; Brooks et al. 2004). Specifically, Brooks et al. (2004) combined evidence from six postwar democracies and tested the influence of class, religion and gender on vote choice in a comparative perspective. Overall findings are quite mixed, but significant evidence is presented to reject the claim that social cleavages are losing on importance. In fact, countries like Australia, USA and Austria in the late 90s show a growing impact of cleavage structure on voting behavior (Brooks et al. 2004).

All of the studies mentioned in this chapter are dealing with cleavage structures in old democracies and represent the analysis with a different scope conditions. But what about cleavage structures in post-communist societies and specifically in Montenegro? Tucker (2002) survey the articles published on the topic of electoral politics and voting behavior in post-communist countries from 1991 to 2000. While those articles provide evidence on the importance of cleavage structures in post-communist society's neglectful attention has been devoted to the study of former Yugoslavia or specifically for the interest of this paper of Montenegro. Exclusion to the rule is one recent study by Komar(2013). In her research on voting patterns in Montenegro, Komar (2013) concluded that sociodemographic relations are significant predictors of voting behavior in Montenegro. Furthermore, ethnicity and religion are two main identity issues which positioned themselves as dominant social cleavages. According to Komar, national identity is the basic program

difference between political parties (2013). Komar's findings can be put in a broader perspective elaborated in several articles on ethnicity. Depending on the context ethnic identity can be comprised of multiple dimensions such as religion, language, race, cast which can provide basis for different interaction and different conflicts between ethnic identities. In addition, political conflict can be entrenched alongside these multiple dimensions and not just alongside one (Chandra, 2005; Laitin, 1986; Posner, 2004a, 2005; cited in Dunning and Harrison, 2010). Going back to Liphart (1980) and the relevance of religion and ethnicity, in the Montenegrin context, a case could be made that ethnicity, crosscut by religion and language creates at least two specific political identities.<sup>6</sup> The development of religious and language differences between Montenegrins and Serbs was elaborated in the case history. Complementing to Montenegrin ethnicity, it could be argued that religious affiliation to Montenegrin Orthodox Church and Montenegrin language create a specific identity which can be named as political Montenegrin. Due to a highly politicized opinions on the mater, it is highly unlikely that an individual will incorporate only two out of these three dimensions but in such a case Iwill also label that identity as political Montenegrin. Any other combination will produce an identity labeled political Serbs.<sup>7</sup>

Religious	Montenegrin Ort	hodov Church	Serbian Orthodox Church		
Affiliation→	Montellegrin ore	nouox church			
Language→	Montenegrin	Serbian	Montenegrin	Serbian	
	I	1	1	T	
Ethnicity↓	Language	Language	Language	Language	

Table 1:	Political	Identitv	Classi	fication <sup>8</sup>
				,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The reason why I argue religious and linguistic cleavages complement ethnic cleavage is contained in the nature of the former. Namely religious cleavages are organized not along the lines of different religions but different Churches of Orthodox Christianity. Furthermore, differences between the Montenegrin and Serbian language are minor. More detailed explanation is contained in case history.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Although there is no hard evidence to support the classification of nationalities in this table I believe there is little evidence to support the claim that is incorrect. Furthermore, the author firmly believes that a combination of Serbian ethnicity and religious affiliation to the Montenegrin Orthodox Church or Montenegrin language is even more unlikely than the two out of 3 combination of political Montenegrins and for that reason all other combinations of identity dimension will be labelled as political Serb.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>The necessity of making such a classification comes from a sampling issue faced by some researches which conducted research on University of Montenegro (Batrićević, 2015,). Namely, researchers are faced with a problem of samples over reporting Montenegrin ethnicity and underreporting Serbian ethnicity.

Montenegrin	Political Montenegrin	Political Montenegrin	Political Montenegrin	Political Serb
Serbian	Political Serb	Political Serb	Political Serb	Political Serb

Is ethnic cleavage really so influential in voting behavior? Do voters choose their preferences based on ethnic or some other political preferences? Posner (2005) offers a valid explanation as to why ethnic cleavage a salient for group classification. Basically, ethnic identities are formed around group characteristic that are not susceptible to change. In some cases as the color of skin they are impossible to change, while in others such as religion and language they are difficult to change (Posner, 2005). Furthermore, ethnicity as an organizing principle emerges from authoritarian regimes, perhaps nurtured and strengthened, to political arena in new democracies as democracy strongly encourages the expression of identity (Birnir, 2007). Birnir (2007) continues that ethnic identification is probably the only developed source of political identification in new democracies. Therefore, it is the only politically salient cleavage capable of significant political mobilization (Crawford, 1996, cited in Birnir, 2007). This undeveloped political space renders old democracies information cues useless where an environment of low political information is present. Thus, in such an environment only *stable ethnic-information shortcut* provides sufficient information for political choices (Birnir, 2007)."In short ethnic voters have more information about the ethnic party than non-ethnic voters have about any of the parties that appeal to them" (Birnir, 2007).

If Montenegrin voters are indeed influenced by cleavage structures in vote choice, then they are not basing their vote choice on the principles of instrumental rationality. Instead their choice is closer to the principles of expressive behavior<sup>9</sup>. Here I should first introduce

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>Note that instrumental rationality can be associated with etchnic voting patterns especially if we consider small minority groups in a diverse society. However, in cases where parties of majority ethnic groups base their program differences on ethincity without any difference in economic policy proposed, Im inclined to

a broad distinction between voting based on instrumental rationality and expressive voting. What is important to mention is the claim that was raised in the Hamlin and Jennings article (2011), namely that there are no pure cases of either instrumental rationality or expressive voting but voters respond to different kind of incentives, benefits and give them the appropriate weight. The basic idea of expressive vote is that voting and voting in a particular way "may express some aspect of voters belief, values ideology or identity...and is valuable to the individual in its own right and provides sufficient motivation to vote" (Hamlin and Jennings, 2010).Where this approaches differ can be summarized in three points:

- 1. Voting is expressive if it derives from the underlying symbolic meaning of voting
- 2. Expressive behavior should be understood relative to an audience (the individual can be his/her own audience)
- 3. Both expressive and instrumental choices may be "true", even when they are in conflict. Neither one should be viewed as more essential than the other (Hamlin and Jennings, 2011).

Regarding the expressive choice itself, Hillman (2011) argues that there are two dimensions of expressive behavior. First dimension is the general decision to cast the vote and second is the decision for whom to vote specifically. More importantly expressive logic of the low-cost voting decision enables voters to choose the layer of identity they want to express even if expressing that identity is contrary to their self-interest (Hillman, 2011). From this perspective in the Montenegrin case I will argue that the choice of voting for a specific party may come from reaffirming a specific identity of an individual. Perhaps the most present layer of expressive voting as symbolic is the meaning of the vote for a national (ethnic) party. In a sense it is a symbolic statement that differentiates "us" from "them". Furthermore, the voter can express his choice aiming to confirm his social identity with a specific party or candidate (Hamlin and Jennings, 2011; also see Nelson, 1994; Schuessler, 2001)). Specifically, Komar (2013) argues that if we reduce social identity to national, ethnic identity than sufficient evidence can be found to support the claim that in

assume that voting patterns are closer to the expressive bahivior model. Montenegro represents such a case (Komar, 2013).

Montenegro vote choice is an expression of social identity. Furthermore, Komar (2010) argues that party programs are organized alongside these salient cleavages. This claim is particularly important if we bear in mind that "what is available to be expressed depends on the options before the voter" (Brennan, 2008). In other words, for voters to be able to behave expressively and confirm their social (ethnic) identity via vote choice to a corresponding party system with parties organized alongside salient cleavage issues much be in place. In this study I will regard the expressed ethnic identity based on the political identity classification made above.

So far in this paper I have argued that the low electoral volatility may be the consequence of the ethnic voter-party linkage. But how strong is that linkage? Part of the answer will come from the data about the actual correlation between vote choice and ethnicity in Montenegro. But there is another and probably more relevant way of looking at the issue: Do voters care about other important information such as candidate reputation, ideological position or personal characteristics? The basic assumption is that if voters are familiar with the dishonesty and corruption affiliated with the candidate running for office they would not vote for him/her (Peters and Welch, 1980). Furthermore, if we are analyze an "incumbent" case, we expect that incumbent to be punished ("electoral retribution") at the following election (Peters and Welch, 1980). In spite of the general expectations, Peters and Welch (1980) argue that "this belief...contrasts with the striking examples of members of Congress and others being reelected by overwhelming majorities even after indictments or convictions for gross violations of the public trust". In the analysis of Brazilian local elections evidence was found that voters do hold the majors accountable for their misconduct but not so strongly that it discourages misbehavior (Pereira et al. 2008). Peters and Welch (1980) survey possible explanations for the individual decision to support the corrupt candidate<sup>10</sup>. Two explanations are particularly interesting in the light of the argument made about ethnic voter/party affiliation in Montenegro. First, in some cases

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> One additional factor that should be taken into consideration is the different dimensions of corruption and how are they interpreted by the public (Redlawsk and McCann, 2005). What is characterized as corrupt behavior by one citizen does not resolute with all the others in the political community (Redlawsk and McCann, 2005). Undertaking an effort to define corruption is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I will take into consideration the distinction made between different dimensions of corruption and refer the analysis and findings in this paper only to the dimension that affiliates corruption with breaking the law.

voters are ignorant about the accusation made on a certain candidate (Bryce, 1959; Levin, 1960; cited in Peters and Welch, 1980). Second, voters actually weight the corruption accusation with other factors such as party linkage (Rundquist et al. 1977). "If, on the other hand, a voter likes a particular candidates political party or stand on important issue, the voter may discount any corruption charges leveled against the candidate and vote for him (or her) anyway "(Peters and Welch, 1980). Can this "trading" argument be applied in the Montenegrin context? If I expose voters in Montenegro to evidence of the candidates dishonesty, unethical and criminal conduct will it affect their vote choice? How stable is the ethnic voter/party affiliation and do they actually weigh the misconduct allegation with other factors?In the next section I propose a two stage experimental setup through which I aim at answering both the questions of the effect of ethnic cleavage on vote choice and the stability of the vote.

## Methodology

I am not aware of prior data sets or papers dealing specifically with the effect of ethnic cleavage on vote choice in Montenegro<sup>11</sup>. For researching this particular issuel propose a two-stage experiment with a sample of Montenegrin students. I choose this particular setup for two reasons. First, students are an age cohort that was strongly influenced by national schemata as the referendum occurred during the period of formative years for their personal values (see Hooghe and Wilkenfeld, 2008 and; Kasser et al. 2002,). Especially after the referenda there has been as strong movement for rebuilding Montenegrin national identity through the creation of the Montenegrin language and Montenegrin Orthodox Church. The student population has been strongly affected by this development, as they were in the center of educational reform that introduced Montenegrin language into schools but also allowing for students to choose the name of the language they will learn at schools (Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian or Mother tongue). The process of choosing the name of the language was highly politicized and can be regarded as a way of expressing political identity. The name of the language was contained in official transcripts and documents due to the politicized process it made private information on political and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> In her PhD dissertation Komar (2013) does an exploratory research of voting behavior in Montenegro, where ethnic predictors are used as part of the indicators testing a wide aray of voting behaviour theories.

ethnic affiliation of individuals somewhat public. Following this argument, the student population should have a clear idea on their ethnic and political identity and will serve the aim of this research well. In addition, it is also a group that I can have easy access to, so the feasibility of my study will not be compromised due to the small number of respondents.

Second, experimental design offers the possibility to control for other factors and is ideal for testing the theory as it can guarantee that the hypothesized difference between groups is due to the treatment effect and not some other intervening variable. Thus, I will apply experimental design by which a clear causal mechanism can be established between the independent and dependent variables.

The experiment designed for this purpose is divided into two distinct stages and tested on three distinct groups with an internal division into Montenegrins and Serbs. The short outline of the experiment is presented in Table 2 . Further explanation of the design follows below.

	Treatment Groups							
	Control G	roup	Test Gro	up 1	Test Group 2			
First	Political speech		Montenegrin Candidate political speech		Serbian candidate political speech			
stage	Political	Political	Political	Political	Political	Political		
	Montenegrin	Serb	Montenegrin	Serb	Montenegrin	Serb		
	Nourananan	articlo	Montenegrin	Montenegrin candidate		ndidate		
Second	Newspaper	article	newspaper article		newspaper	article		
stage	Political	Political	Political	Political	Political	Political		
	Montenegrin	Serb	Montenegrin	Serb	Montenegrin	Serb		

Table 2: Experimental Design: Treatment and Control Conditions

In the first stage, students participating in the experiment will be randomly assigned to one of the three groups. Each of the three groups will consist out of students that declare themselves as Montenegrins and the group of students that declare themselves as Serbs.<sup>12</sup> I will use a similar stimulus as the one that has been used by Dunning and Harrison (2010) in their research of ethnic voting in Mali. The authors used videos of independent political candidates as treatment in which all group have been shown the same video with manipulation of the politician's last name, which conveys the information about ethical identity. In Montenegro the last name is not a sufficient cue for conveying the ethnicity of the candidate, and therefore the treatment will require some further information about the candidate's ethnic affiliation. Instead of a video,<sup>13</sup> each group in my experiment will be treated with 400 to 450 word political speech<sup>14</sup> on an economic issue from a social democratic perspective. The same speech will be used in all three groups as treatment with minor differences that convey the ethnicity of the author. One of the groups will be treated with the political speech of a candidatewho clearly distinguishes himself as Montenegrin, uses Montenegrin language and Latin alphabet, and comes from a town dominantly populated by Montenegrins. In this particular case I will test two initial hypothesis.

**H1a**: There will be a difference in the approval rate of the Montenegrin candidate between Montenegrins and Serbs.

**H1b**: Montenegrin candidate will have higher approval rate among Montenegrins than among Serbs.

Second group willbe treated with the same political speech but the candidatewill clearly distinguish himself as a Serb, use Cyrillic alphabet and comes from a town populated mostly by Serbs. As in the first case I formulate two initial hypothesis.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Several other nationalities are represented trough political parties in Montenegrin party system. It is my belief that ethnic cleavage between these two biggest groups is the most influential one and that including others will unnecessary complicate the research design. Furthermore, other ethnicities can be view as ethnic minorities and the political affiliation to their ethnic parties can be considered to represent ethnic politics more as opposed to cleavage politics.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Considering the budget of this research and my very basic skills in video editing it is my belief that a newspaper article is a better solution for treatment than a video of candidates.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> The text should be long enough to ensure that the general economic idea is identifiable but not so long that the respondents lose their interest in reading. Computer based test can help with that issue since it is possible to control for the time respondents spent reading the text.

**H2a**: There will be a difference in the approval rate of the Serbian candidate between Montenegrins and Serbs.

**H2b**: Serbian candidate will have higher approval rate among Serbs than among Montenegrins.

Third experimental group has serve as a control group. They were be treated with the same speech without information that convey ethnic affiliations of the author.Since the control group will not have ethnic information cues I formulate the following hypothesis.

**H3**: The overall approval rate of the candidate will be lower compared to the stimulus groups.

This design will allow making comparisons both between the experimental groups and within the groups.<sup>15</sup>

Due to the specific variables that can influence voting preferences I have used computer based design with randomization effect. Dynamic Process Tracing Environment offers a platform for computer based experimental design and provides necessary interface for experimental setup and data collection. In the setup I should at least control for several intervening variables. First, for the political speech I chose economic issue because I presume that the impact of ethnicity in this field should be minimal compared to other politically salient issues in Montenegro. I also presume that political preferences influence voters' preferences on economic issues. Since that is the case some sort of control should be introduced. To control for the economic preferences in the pretest I have used left-right scale of economic preferences.<sup>16</sup>

On possible problem that I could encounter is the difference in group sizes in the experiment. Researchers at the Faculty of Political Science in Podgorica experienced a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Left - Right scale from Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems will be used. I decided to use more questions rather than just the standard question "On a scale from 1 to 10 where do you position yourself in terms of left-right where 1 represents left and 10 represents right". It should provide more precise measurement of the real ideological stance of the respondents and help me understand the preexisting views that respondents can have on the (treatment) political speech from a social democratic perspective.

disproportionally larger response rate among Montenegrins as compared to Serbs. Specifically for that reason in the theory chapter I presented the theoretical classification as political Montenegrin or political Serb. This logic will be used to recode the indicator questions for ethnicity, language and religion and create a single variable. Second, to control for the already established voting preferences no party affiliation of author of the speech will be mentioned. This will ensure that all differences encountered can be assigned to the ethnicity of the author and not of respondent's opinion of author's political party.

After the treatment,two manipulation checks will follow. First, the platform offers process tracing and records the time respondents spent on the stimulus item. This data will serve as an initial check whether the respondents actually read the treatment or not. Second, I apply several questions for manipulation check. These questions test whether the treatment conveyed the ethnicity of the author to the respondent by asking: "What do you think is the authors nationality?". In addition, aposttest will measure the level of agreement with the solution mentioned in the speech. Furthermore, It will measure how prepared are the respondents to vote for the specific candidate and their assessment of how successful this candidate would be. This stage of the experiment is mainly taken from the Dunning and Harrison (2010). I will also employ some tools from an article about gender bias in Scandinavia, where Matland (1994) used post treatment measures that fit the aim of this research nicely.

In the second stage of the experiment I aim at testing how strong is the ethnic tie between voter and candidate and how strongly is the vote based on ethnic linkage. When confronted with additional information about the candidate's morality and illegal activity, does the approval rate goes down? For that purpose I introduce an additional treatment in each of the groups. In the first group I introduce a newspaper article about the alleged vote buying during the last parliamentary elections. An off the record source from the police has leaked the information to the press about the investigation along with the name of the perpetrator. The newspaper article states that the author of the political speech in the first stage of the experiment was involved in a pyramid scheme of vote buying. In this sense pyramid scheme means that lower party members did not act independently but were instructed and funded by higher level party members. The article is a changed version of an actual

article from a major newspaper in Montenegro ("Vijesti").The reasons for choosing a supposed newspaper article as treatment is based on the findings of Chang et al. (2010). In their article, Chang et al. analyze the malfeasance of Italian public officials during eleven consecutive legislations. They find that judicial investigation did not discourage the candidates from running for office nor did it affect their support rate. Furthermore, what they observe is the change in the level of political accountability in the early 90s. They attribute the change to the role of free media and argue that political accountability can only be obtained through the joint influence of judiciary and media (Chang et al. 2010). For that particular reason the newspaper article is about the judicial investigation on the vote buying scheme. In that way I was able to connect the theorized role of the judiciary and media for political accountability andI choosethe particular issue of vote buying to make the article more realistic. Indeed vote buying is often identified as a big electoral problem and violation both moral and legal and it's been perceived by a large portion of the public as a wide spread practice in Montenegro. For the first group I create two initial hypothesis.

**H4a**: There will be no difference in the candidate's approval rate within Montenegrins compared to the measurement after the first treatment.

**H4b**: Compared with the measurement after the first treatment candidates approval rate will be lower within the Serbs.

In the second group I use the same newspaper article with the change of the candidates name so that it matches the name used in the second group first stage of the experiment. In the particular case I formulate two initial hypotheses.

**H5a**: There will be no difference in the candidate's approval rate within Serbs compared to the measurement after the first treatment.

**H5b**: Compared with the measurement after the first treatment candidates approval rate will be lower within the Montenegrins.

In the control group I introduce the same second treatment without ethnic cues. As respondents in this group are assumed not to have ethnic linkage with the candidate I formulate the following hypothesis.

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H6: Approval rate of the candidate will drop significantly compared to the stimulus groups.

After the second stimulus, I again include a two stage manipulation check. I record the time respondents spent on the stimulus item. Then one question ask whether the respondents believe the allegations in the newspaper article. Another question asks whether they changed their opinion of the candidate for better or for worse. In addition, I ask again several of the questions asked after the first treatment to conduct a formal testing of the hypotheses.

The description of the response variables for hypothesis testing can be found in the next chapter. As a cover story for the experiment I used the annual conference on political communication for political parties' youth organized by Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. The respondents were told that political parties' youth receives training in political communication and as a test of the application of the training received they are instructed to write and deliver a speech on a certain topic. The presented aim of the research is to evaluate the quality of those speeches.

## **Data and Measurement**

The data was collected from 28<sup>th</sup> of September until 24<sup>th</sup> of October on the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Montenegro. Preliminary sample consist out of 103 respondents allocated to three experimental groups. Each respondent had equal allocation probability of being assigned to each of the groups. Nevertheless, group size varied from 39 respondents in the control group to 28 and 38 in Montenegrin and Serbian test groups. Unequal sample sizes are the consequence of dropout rate, item nonresponse and stimulus





check. Out of initial 129 respondents 26 were excluded for not reading stimulus items carefully enough (spent less than 30 seconds on the stimulus item). On average respondents spent 136 seconds (sd= 83) on stimulus item 1, while they spent 94 seconds (sd=67s) on stimulus item2. Distribution of the attention to stimuli is in the following histograms.

As for the basic demographic variables the sample consists out of students 18 to 24 years of age. Furthermore, it over reports women (W (71), M (32)). By far the most important demographic variables for the purpose of this research are ethnicity, religiousness and language. As assumed in the previous chapters the sample is biased and over represents members of Montenegrin ethnicity. In the sample 82 respondents reported being ethnic Montenegrins, while only 13 respondents reported being Serbs. At this point because of the small sample size of Serbs which is further divided into 3 experimental groups, group comparison would not be possible. For this particular reason I recoded the variables of ethnicity, religiousness and language according to the theoretical explanation discussed earlier in this paper. This increased the sample size of Serbs from 13 to 33. Actual distribution of political identities among experimental groups is presented in the following histogram.



Histogram 2: Political Identity Distribution across Samples

One of the biggest advantages of experimental political science is that the portion of the variation in the data comes from the decisions made by the researcher and his intervention in the data-generating process (GDP). In order for this to be true several assumptions must be meet. The most important assumption concerns the randomization effect in experimental design trough which we hope to obtain very similar control and test groups. To control for the randomization effect and group similarity I conducted several analysis.

First, the political speech that conveys ethnic information is a statement of economic policy, thus potential difference in approval rate of the candidate can be a consequence of group differences in economic preferences. To control for differences/similarities six questions on economic preferences were included in the pretest questionnaire<sup>17</sup>. To get a single measurement of economic preference I summed up the responses and divided them by 6 to create Index of Economic Preferences. Basic descriptive statistics is presented in the following table.

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics: Index of Economic Preference

Variable	n	Mean	SD	Median	Min	Max	Skew	Kurtosis
Index of Economic Preference	103	5.63	1.41	5.5	1.33	8.83	-0.12	-0.16

From the Table 3 I see that the responses are normally distributed having a mean value of 5.63. Higher values on the scale indicate more leftist view on the economic issues. Since the stimulus item was written from a center-left perspective judging from this distribution, on average respondents should like the candidate. Furthermore, I conducted ANOVA test to check for group differences. The f statistics indicate that the model p values is not within the range of statistical significance, so I don't reject the null hypothesis of no difference between the groups.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>In the next question you will have a chance to read confronted opinions on some important contemporary issues. Using a scale from 1 to 10 please indicate how much do you agree with one or the other opinion. For more information check question 10 in the appendix.

	Index of Economic Preference					
	DF	Sum SQ	Mean SQ	F test	P value	
Experimental Groups	1	1.681	1.681	0.84	0.36	
Residuals	101	201.815	1.99			

Table 4: One Way ANOVA: Index of Economic Preference by Experimental Groups

Second, in the pretest I included a general measurement of left right political preferences measured on a scale from 1 to 10. Basic descriptive reveal a normal distribution with a mean of 5.08 and standard deviation of 1.62. Compared with the results of the Index of Economic Preference I can see that on average respondents are politically more centerright, while they were more center-left on economic issues only. Basic descriptive statistics can be found in the in the following table.

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics: Positioning on a Left-Right Political Scale

Variable	n	Mean	SD	Median	Min	Max	Skew	Kurtosis
Left-Right Political Scale	103	5.08	1.62	5	2	10	0.41	0.19

To test the effect of randomization, I conducted ANOVA test of left right positioning by experimental groups. The f statistics produced p value that is not within the range of statistical significance, so I failed to reject the null hypothesis of no difference between the groups. The results of ANOVA are inTable 6.

	Table 6: One Way ANOVA	Positioning on a Left-Rig	ght Political Scale by E	Experimental Groups
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	Left-Right Political Scale					
	DF	Sum SQ	Mean SQ	F test	P value	
Experimental Groups	1	0.80	0.80	0.3	0.58	
Residuals	101	266.57	2.63			

Third, the pretest included questions on the level of trust in political institutions<sup>18</sup>. Comparing the level of trust for every single institution would consume unnecessary space and time, so first I conducted principal component analysis to identify underlying factors from the data. Based on the accounted variance and how meaningful the components were I was able to reduce the number from 10 observed to 2 latent variables covering 55% of the total variance. First component doesn't provide a clear cut point but can be interpreted as to identify those who score either low of high on all variables, but have slightly more or less trust into state institutions compared to church, NGOs, EU and NATO. This componentaccount for 38% of the total variance in the data. Second component clearly makes a distinction between the respondents and identifies those who have high level of trust in NGOs, EU and NATO while they have low level of trust in the state institutions and the Church. The results of the PCA are presented in the following table.

	Principal Components		
	Comp.1	Comp.2	
Variables:			
Government	-0.38	-0.35	
Parliament	-0.37	-0.27	
President	-0.30	-0.34	
Political Parties	-0.34	0.06	
Judiciary	-0.34	0.06	
Police	-0.38	0.06	
NGOs	-0.25	0.36	
Church and other religious institutions	-0.15	-0.40	
EU	-0.29	0.42	
NATO	-0.27	0.45	

Table 7: Principal Component Analysis: Levels of Institutional Trust<sup>19</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>Included institutions: Government, Parliament, President, Political Parties, Judiciary, Police, NGO, Church and other religious institutions, EU, NATO. <sup>19</sup>Complete table can be found in Appendix.

Proportion of variance	0.39%	0.16%
Cumulative variance	0.39%	0.55%

I isolated these two principal components and created new variables out of them. Then, I used these two variables to make comparison between the groups. In both cases f statistics showed the p value to be out of range of statistical significance so I failed to reject the null hypotheses of no difference between the groups. The results of ANOVA are presented in the following table.

		Principal Component 1						
	DF	Sum SQ	Mean SQ	F test	P value			
Experimental Groups	2	3.54	1.771	0.45	0.64			
Residuals	99	393.72	3.97					
		Prin	cipal Compo	nent 2				
	DF	Sum SQ	Mean SQ	F test	P value			
Experimental Groups	2	3.49	1.748	1.05	0.35			
Residuals	99	163.517	1.6517					

Table 8: One Way ANOVA - Principal Components by Experimental Groups

From the formal testing conducted in this chapter I can conclude that there are no differences between the groups on economic positioning, general left-right political positioning and institutional trust. In this particular case the randomization effect produced very similar groups.

Moving on to the measurement level used for dependent variables, to measure the level of approval - the main dependent variable – I asked "If there was an election held tomorrow, how likely is that you would vote for the list that the author of the speech represents?" The answers were recorded on a scale from 1 to 5 where 5 represented higher probability.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>Other solution was to ask a question "If there were elections held tomorrow, would you vote for the author of the speech you just read?" I opted for the option described in the main text for two reasons. First, the alternative would require a binary answer of Yes or No while the treatment is not sufficiently strong to

The questionnaire included several other response variables taken from Dunning and Harrison (2010) experiment<sup>21</sup>. These variables refer to the measurement of different dimensions of approval ranging from the candidate likability, competence, and intelligence to his overall ability to do a good job if elected. These variables will be used to test for the difference between the groups. Specific response variables and their level of measurement are presented in

Table 9.

Variable	Range
Likelihood of casting a vote for the candidate	1-522
General evaluation of the speech	1-7
Candidate: Likable	1-5
Candidate: Competent	1-5
Candidate: Intelligent	1-5
Candidate: Trustworthy	1-5
Candidate would: Do a good job	1-7
Candidate would: Coup bad with the problems	1-7
Candidate would: Fight for his ideals	1-7
I agree with the candidates political program	1-7
I was impressed	1-7
Candidate has good reason to stand for	1-7
elections	

Table 9: Response Variables for the first treatment

After the second treatment I used three main response variables for both within and between group hypothesis testing.<sup>23</sup> Since the article claimed that the candidate was

<sup>22</sup>Higher numbers indicate higher level of affiliation and approval.

produce that kind of clear-cut decision. Second, the options for formal statistical testing would be limited to methods applied to categorical data.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> This facilitates a more nuanced statement of the respondents regarding what they think about the candidate. The treatment was supplemented with information about the candidate's competence and personal achievements. It is my belief, and the results of Dunning and Harrison (2010) provides evidence to support the claim, that these measurements are valid operationalization for the specific issue.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>I've decided not to include all of the response variables used after the first treatment for several reasons. First, repeating all questions would unnecessarily burden the respondents and jeopardize the quality of the

involved in illegal vote buying I asked again the following questions: "In your opinion how trustworthy is this candidate?"; "How competent is the candidate to achieve his political goals?"; and the main response variable "If there was an election held tomorrow, how likely is that you would vote for the list that the author of the speech represents?". For all the questions I used the same level of measurement as in the first stage of the experiment.

# Results

## Test Group 1: Montenegrin candidate political speech Effect of Ethnicity on Vote Choice

Prior to conducting formal tests I first checked the results of the manipulation check. The results are the following: 25 out of 28 respondents said the political candidates is Montenegrin, 1 stated that he is Serbian and 2 respondents were not sure. Based on this I can conclude with certainty that the stimulus item conveyed the ethnicity of the candidate. formally test my hypothesis I used two versions of t test: two sample t test and paired sample t test. First, I will test the hypothesis proposed for the treatment group that read political speech of the Montenegrin candidate.

The null hypothesis for **H1a** states that there will be no difference in the approval rate of Montenegrin candidate between Montenegrins and Serbs. **H1b** is a directional hypothesis stating that approval rate (voting intention) will be lower among Serbs compared to Montenegrins. To test these hypothesis I used two sample T test. In the first stages of hypothesis testing formal test revealed that I can reject the null hypothesis of no difference and that indeed approval rate differs in the hypothesized direction. Mean value among the Serbs is 2.31 while the mean values among Montenegrins is 3.33.

Chart 1: Likelihood of Casting a Vote by Political Identity



Table 10: Likelihood of Casting a Vote by Political Identity

Likelihood of Casting a Vote for The Montenegrin Candidate									
Mean CI Upper limit CI Lower limit t-test df p-value									
Serbs	2.30	-1.6	-0.45	-3.665	25.13	0.001157*			
Montenegrins	-1.6 -0.45 -3.665 25.13 0.00115/* Montenegrins 3.33								

To establish whether the difference in the likelihood of vote is actually the result of hypothesised voter/candidate ethnic linkage I continue with the test of supplement dependent variable. More differences that go in favour with this statement can be found in the favouring of candidate, his pleasantness and quality of his speech. Montenegrins are more willing to favor this particular candidate (m =4,66) among others than Serbs(m=3,23). Differences also emerge in evaluating how pleasant the candidate is where on average Montenegrins score 3.6 while Serbs score 3.2.

Chart 2: How likely are you to favor this candidate oppose to others? How pleasant a person the candidate is? By Political Identity



Table 11: Welch Two Sample T Test: Favor the Candidate and Candidate is a Pleasant Person by Political Identity

Favor this candidate									
	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value			
Serbs	3.23	-2 47	-0 39	-2 833	25 99	0 008**			
Montenegrins	4.66	2.17	0.07	2.000	20.99	0.000			
Candidate is a	pleasant pers	sons							
	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value			
Serbs	3.23	-0.87	-0.004	-2.09	23 192	0 047**			
Montenegrins	3.66	0.07	0.001	2.09	25.172	0.017			

In addition, t test reveals differences in how Serbs and Montenegrins rate the quality of the speech they just read. On average Serbs rate the speech with 3.9 while Montenegrins do so with 4.9.All of the mentioned differences are significant at significance level p< 0.05.





Table 12: Welch Two Sample T Test: Quality of Speech by Political Identity

Quality of speech								
	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value		
Serbs	3.9	-1.87	-0.14	-2.40	25.33	0.023**		
Montenegrins	4.9							

However, considering other dependant variables such as competence, intelligence and trustworthinessdifference between the groups is not statistically significant. What I conclude from the results is that despite the fact that both groups view the candidate as equally competent, intelligent and trustworthy difference emerges in their propensity to vote for his party list. Furthermore, additional tests revealed that there are no differences between political Montenegrin and political Serbs in their views on economic policy or left right positioning, prior to the stimuli the groups were almost identical.All of this implies that there is something else they take into consideration when deciding to cast the vote. Since the only additional information I convey through the stimulus item is ethnicity of the candidate I can claim that this makes the difference in their vote choice. I reject the **H1a** 

and **H1b** null hypothesis and conclude that the candidate's ethnicity does have an effect when candidate is Montenegrin. Namely, Montenegrins are more likely that Serbs to vote for a Montenegrin candidate. The results of the tests conducted are presented in the following table.

Candidate is a	Candidate is and intelligent person							
	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value		
Serbs	2.69	-0.61	0.26	-0.82	25 32	0 41		
Montenegrins	2.87	0101	0120	0101	20102	0111		
Candidate is a	nd competent	person						
	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value		
Serbs	3.15	-0.95	0.45	-0.72	25 528	0.48		
Montenegrins	3.4	0170	0110	017 2	201020	0110		
Candidate is and trustworthy person								
	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value		
Serbs	2.84	-0.75	0.17	-1 27	25 99	0.21		
Montenegrins	3.13	-0.75 0.17		1127		0.21		
Index of Econo	omic Preferen	ces						
	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value		
Serbs	5.92	-1 10	1 1 5	0.042	25 753	0.96		
Montenegrins	5.9	1110	1110	01012	201700	0170		
Left Right Positioning on Political Scale								
	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value		
Serbs	5.3	-0.68	1 82	0 94	24 086	0.35		
Montenegrins	4.7	0.00	1.02	0.71	21.000	0.00		

Table 13: Welch Tw	o Sample T Test Intellio	ence Competence and T	Trustworthiness h	Political Identity
TUDIE 15. WEICH IW	o sumple i rest. intemig	ence, competence unu i	TUSEWOI LITTIESS D	γ Εθπαίζαι ιαθπάιξ

#### Effect of Ethnicity on Vote Stability

In the second stage of the experiment I introduce information on candidate's misbehavior and my question is how ethnic voter/candidate linkage effects vote choice. The stimulus check showed that 23 out of 28 respondents said the allegations in the newspaper article are very of highly likely to be true, while 5 stated the opposite, the allegations are very of highly unlikely to be true.<sup>24</sup>

Since I have established the ethnic voter/candidate linkage in Montenegrin test group I now move to see how strong that ethnic affiliation is. More specifically I in this chapter I will test two hypothesis:

**H4a**: There will be no difference in the candidate's approval rate within Montenegrins compared to the measurement after the first treatment.

**H4b**: Compared with the measurement after the first treatment candidates approval rate will be lower within the Serbs.

For this purpose I use paired sample T test. In the first stage of hypothesis testing I first checked whether there was an overall difference in the likelihood of casting a vote for the candidate prior to the introduction of second stimuli and after. The analysis showed the on average respondents were less likely to vote for the same candidate with the mean difference of 0.64. The difference was highly statistically significant at the level of p<0.001.

In the second stage of hypothesis testing I wanted to see whether this differences comes from both the political Montenegrins and political Serbs, or is the result of one group dropping the approval rate. Paired sample T test showed that there was a statistically significant drop of approval rate in both groups. Opposite to my theory Montenegrins dropped the approval rate in average by 0.73 while Serbs dropped the approval rate by 0.54. Based on these results I cannot reject the null **H4a** hypothesis of difference between the approval rate before and after the corruption information among Montenegrins. Indeed they show less tolerance towards the candidate. Furthermore, I cannot reject the null **H4b** hypothesis of approval rate not being lower between the Serbs. The results and visualization of paired sample t test follows.

Table 14: Paired Sample T Test: Likelihood of Casting a Vote

#### Likelihood of Casting a Vote: Overall

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>For now I'll keep all the respondents in because of already small sample size. If it gets bigger ill just keep in the ones who believe in the allegations.

Mean Difference 0.64	CI Upper limit 0.36	CI Lower limit 0.93	t-test 4.653	df 27	p-value 0.000***
Likelihood of	Casting a Vote: S	Serbs			
Mean					
Difference	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
0.53	0.14	0.94	2.94	12	0.01**
Likelihood of	Casting a Vote: N	Montenegrins			
Mean					
Difference	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
0.73	0.29	1.17	3.55	14	0.003**

Chart 4:Paired Sample T test: Likelihood of Casting a Vote by Political Identity



Despite of what has been said in the previous paragraph few thing should be noted. Although I see a bigger drop in the approval rate among Montenegrins the results are not substantively the same. In the case of Montenegrin subsample although the mean difference is bigger (0.73) because of the initial mean value (3.33) after the corruption information mean value is 2.6 which on a scale from 1 to 5, can still be interpreted as Montenegrin candidate having a chance of being voted by Montenegrins. On the other hand mean difference of 0.54 in the subsample of Serbians drops the approval rate from in average 2.3 to 1.76 meaning Montenegrin candidate has very slim chances of being voted by Serbs.

Considering other variables included after the second stimuli the findings are bit different. In the case of candidates competence overall I see a drop in the opinion of respondent about candidates competence on average by 0.6 (significant at p<0.001). But the differences among the groups behave differently compared to the likelihood of casting a

vote. In the Serbian subsample candidates competence drops at a higher rate on average by 0.69(significant at p<0.05), while in the Montenegrin subsample it drops by 0.5(significant at p<0.05). Once again because of the previous average results the drop is more substantive in the Serbian subsample as it lowers the average from 3.14 to 2.45 compared to the drop in Montenegrin subsample from 3.4 to 2.9.

As for the trustworthiness, overall on average respondents view the candidate less trustworthy by 0.43(significant at p<0.05). Within the groups, Serbs view the candidate less trustworthy on average by 0.53(significant at p<0.05) while Montenegrin view the candidate less trustworthy by 0.33 (significant at p<0.1). Yet again the change is bigger and more substantive in the Serbian subsample as it on average lowers the rate of trustworthiness from 2.84 to 2.31 compared to Montenegrin subsample where the drop is from 3.13 to 2.8.

Few conclusion could be drawn out of this analysis. First I was unable to confirm the strength of the hypothesized differences that will occur in the Montenegrin and Serbian subsample after the introduction of corruption information. Second, the dismissal is not so straightforward. Both in the cases of trustworthiness and competence the change occurs in the way I suggest in my theory. In the likelihood of casting the vote the change occurs differently but still has more substantive impact on the Serbian subsample. Namely while average values of all three variables are very negative values in the Serbian subsample, candidate still has a chance of being voted by Montenegrin subsample, is considered to be a relatively competent and trustworthy person.

## Test Group 2: Serbian candidate political speech Effect of Ethnicity on Vote Choice

Prior to appliance of formal test to hypothesis for the second test group I first looked at the distribution of answers on stimulus check question. The stimulus wasn't as effective as in the first test group, 21 out of 38 respondents correctly identified the author of the speech as Serbian. This resulted in some problems in the hypothesis testing. More on the issues will follow at the end of the chapter.

In the first stage of hypothesis testing I first wanted to check whether there are group's differences in the voting intention for Serbian candidate and test the null hypothesis of no difference. The results of the test showed no evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no difference. Actually in this testing stage all tests including variables such as competence, trustworthiness, quality of speech, pleasantness, intelligence and favor this candidate among others showed no difference in the group means. What is intriguing is that the mean differences mostly go contrary to what my theory suggests. For example, although the differences are not statistically significant, Montenegrins are likely to vote for the Serbian candidate, to favor the candidate, and rate his speech better than the Serbs do. This observation is important ant in the light of the explanation that will shortly follow about what happened in the data.

Likelihood of (	Casting a Vote					
	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
Serbs	2.3	-0.76	0.54	-0.344	26.958	0.73
Montenegrins	2.4	011 0	0.01	0.011	200000	0170
Favor this Can	didate					
	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
Serbs	3	-1.64	0.55	-1.04	18.789	0.31
Montenegrins	3.54					
Candidate is a	n intelligent p	erson				
	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
Serbs	2.4	-0.68	0.21	-1.09	22.04	0.28
Montenegrins	2.64				-	
Candidate is a	competent pe	rson				
	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
Serbs	3.2	-0.52	0.92	0.52	24.933	0.57
Montenegrins	3.0					
Candidate is a	trustworthy p	erson				
	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
Serbs	2.9	-0.49	1.01	0.75	13.558	0.46
Montenegrins	2.63					
Pleasant perso	on					
	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value
Serbs	3.6	-0.27	0.56	0.74	17.282	0.47
Montenegrins	3.45	-		-		-

Table 15: Two Sample T Test: Dimensions of Candidate Approval by Political Identities

Quality of speech								
	Mean	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value		
Serbs	3.8	-1.76	0.81	-0.77	16.795	0.44		
Montenegrins	4.3							

At this point I should examine three possible explanations for this occurrence: theoretical fallacy, political identity explanation and inadequate stimulus item.

First, the results might not confirm my theory because the theory altogether is wrong. Instead of claiming that voters decide based on ethnic affiliations in this particular case perhaps what drives Serbians into voting is both the question of candidate's ethnicity and right wing nationalist rhetoric.

Second, the theoretical construct of political identity of Montenegrins and Serbs does not have a practical application value. Religious and linguistic dimensions are just a part of political identity but are not a crucial one. Ethnicity remains the only relevant indicator of political identity.

Third, stimulus item failed to convey the ethnicity of the candidate and thus failed to make specific ethnic voter/candidate linkage.

Considering the first explanation, I'm more inclined to look for the answers elsewhere because of several reasons: the theory showed applicable in the case of Montenegrin candidate; what is more likely to be the case is inadequate stimulus item. Furthermore, considering theoretical construct of political identity of Montenegrins and Serbs it showed its practical value in the hypothesis testing of the first test group. Instead of the fallacy in theory and political identity construct I believe the core of the problem is in the inadequate stimulus item. The most plausible argument in favor of inadequate stimulus item comes from the data itself. After the initial analysis I excluded all those who answered wrongly on the stimulus check item and redid the analysis. This reduced the actual sample size to only 18 respondents (7 Serbs and 11 Montenegrins). Because of a very small sample size no difference was found between the groups, but compared to the analysis of the entire sample the direction of the relationship changed. Contrary to the results of the complete

sample in average Serbs gave better scores in competence, intelligence, trustworthiness, quality of speech, pleasantness and were more likely to vote for the Serbian candidate than Montenegrins. Small sample size was at this point the main reason to include all respondents in the analysis even those who didn't answer correctly to the stimulus check item.

#### Effect of Ethnicity on Vote Stability

At this point the hypothesis testing after the second treatment might seem meaningless as I failed to establish a clear ethnic voter/candidate linkage after the first stimulus. Nevertheless, because of the explanations given at the end of the previous chapter, I believe there's still reasoning behind the following analysis.<sup>25</sup>

As in the previous test group, I first checked the distribution of responses on stimulus check item. Out of 36 valid answers, 20 respondents believed the allegations were true, 4 believed them to be false and 12 believed the allegations have an equal chance of being either true or false.

In this chapter ill test the following hypotheses:

**H5a**: There will be no difference in the candidate's approval rate within Serbs compared to the measurement after the first treatment.

**H5b**: Compared with the measurement after the first treatment candidates approval rate will be lower within the Montenegrins.

First, I tested whether there was an overall difference in the voting intention after the introduction of corruption information. The test show a statistically significant mean of the differences of -0.6(p<0.000). Furthermore, I continued with testing the null hypothesis of difference among the Serbs in approval rate of the candidate before and after the corruption information. The test showed that the mean of the differences was 0.1 but the test wasn't statistically significant, therefore I failed to reject the null hypothesis of differences in approval rate before and after the corruption information.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>Bear with me, this is where the results became kind of weird.

In addition, I tested the null hypothesis of approval rate not being lower among Montenegrin. The test showed highly significant results (p<0.000) with the mean of the differences being 0.7. Seeing no difference among the Serbs and having a statistically and substantively significant difference between the Montenegrins I reject the null hypothesis of approval rate not being lower among Montenegrins. The results are presented in the following tables and charts.





Table 16: Paired Sample T Test: Likelihood of Casting a Vote by Political Identity

Likelihood of Casting a Vote: Serbs Mean								
Difference 0.1	CI Upper limit -0.61	CI Lower limit 0.81	t-test 0.318	df 9	p-value 0.75			
Likelihood of	Likelihood of Casting a Vote: Montenegrins							
Difference	CI Upper limit	CI Lower limit	t-test	df	p-value			
0.77	0.36	1.18	3.929	21	0.000***			

As for the other two variables repeated after the second stimuli, the results match the findings of the test conducted on the likelihood of casting a vote. There's no change in the perceived competence and trustworthiness among the Serbs, while Montenegrins on average view the candidate less competent by 0.72(p<0.05) and less trustworthy by 0.63(p<0.05).

The logical question that follows is why is this happening? If the first stimulus did not convey the ethnic information as I intended to, why are the groups still behaving the way I predicted in theory? Once again I made a subset of the sample only out of those who answered correctly on the first stimulus item check. From this analysis I draw the same conclusion as from the analysis with a complete sample. Serbs stick with the Serbian candidate with no difference in the likelihood of casting a vote, competence or trustworthiness while the scores on these dimensions drop among Montenegrins (p<0.05). This is just a partial explanation for a portion of the sample for which I can claim both my theory on ethnic voting linkage and its effect as a vote stabilizer work. At this point I have no idea what going on with the rest of my sample.

#### **Control Group**

Thank you for reading this far. The theory and history chapter are close to what they should look like in the final version. The methodology is pretty done as well. Other parts of are still work in progress. What I didn't have time to write up for this presentation in the hypothesis testing in the control group. It basically behaves like test group with a Montenegrin candidate. Ill provide some reasons why I think this is the case.

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# Appendix

#### **Pre-Treatment Questionnaire**

- 1. Sex:
- a. Female
- b. Male
- 2. How old are you? \_\_\_\_\_
- 3. Are you in ...
- a. 1<sup>st</sup> year of undergraduate studies
- b. 2<sup>nd</sup> year of undergraduate studies
- c. 3<sup>rd</sup> year of undergraduate studies
- d. 4<sup>th</sup> year of undergraduate studies
- e. Master studies
- f. PhD studies
- 4. Nationality:
- a. Montenegrin
- b. Serbian
- c. Croat
- d. Albanian
- e. Bosniak
- f. Other
- 5. Which religious denomination do you belong to?
- a. Montenegrin Orthodox Church (CPC)
- b. Serbian Orthodox Church (SPS)
- c. Islam
- d. Catholicism
- e. Atheism
- f. Agnosticism
- g. Other
- h. Refuse to answer
- 6. How many members are in your household? \_\_\_\_\_
- 7. What language do you speak?
  - a) Montenegrin
  - b) Serbian
  - c) Croatian
  - d) Bosnian

- e) Albanian
- f) Some other
- 8. What is, in average, the monthly amount of household income in your family?
  - a. No household income
  - b. Less than 50 EUR
  - c. Between 51 100 EUR
  - d. Between 101 150 EUR
  - e. Between 151 200 EUR
  - f. Between 201 250 EUR
  - g. Between 251 300 EUR
  - h. Between 301 350 EUR
  - i. Between 351 400 EUR
  - j. Between 401 500 EUR
  - k. Between 501 600 EUR
  - l. Between 601 700 EUR
  - m. Between 701 800 EUR
  - n. Between 801 1000 EUR
  - o. Between 1001 1500 EUR
  - p. Over 1500 EUR
- 9. In politics, people often speak about political left and political right. Where do you see yourself with your political views?

Le	ft							Ri	ght
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

10. In the next question you will have a chance to read confronted opinions on some important contemporary issues. Using a scale from 1 to 10 please indicate how much do you agree with one or the other opinion.

#### A.

People should take more responsibilities on themselves and take care of themselves individually. State should take on more responsibility in providing each individual with what is necessary.

 $1 \ 2 \ 3 \ 4 \ 5 \ 6 \ 7 \ 8 \ 9 \ 10$ 

B.

Unemployed should									Unemployed should		
accept any job									have a right to reject		
offered otherwise									every job that they		
their unemployment									themselves do not		
benefits should be									won't to work on.		
revoked.											
1	2	2	Л	5	6	7	Q	0	10		
1	2	3	Ŧ	5	0	/	0	2	10		
_											

C.

Competition is
harmful. It brings out
the worst in people.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

### D.

State should all	ow									State should impose	
more freedom to									more control on		
companies.										companies.	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

### E.

Income inequality									Difference in income
should be cut down									should be widened as
so everyone will									to bust individual
have a roughly equal									contribution.
income.									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Private property	,								State ownership over	
over companies	5								companies should be	
should be	9						strengthened.			
strengthened										
	-	_		_	_	_	_	_		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	

11. Using a scale from 1 to 5, please rate the amount of trust you have in the following institutions? (1 being no trust at all and 5 being absolute trust)

Institution	No trust at all				Absolute trust
Government of Montenegro	1	2	3	4	5
Parliament of Montenegro	1	2	3	4	5
President of Montenegro	1	2	3	4	5
Political Parties	1	2	3	4	5
Judiciary	1	2	3	4	5
Police	1	2	3	4	5
NGO	1	2	3	4	5
Church and other religious organizations	1	2	3	4	5
EU	1	2	3	4	5
NATO	1	2	3	4	5

F.

### Stimuli: Political Speech (Neutral Group)

Dear Citizens,

Stimuli Montenegro: Dear Citizens of Cetinje,

Stimuli Serbia: Dear Citizens of Berane,

Among the great young people with whom I form the youth movement of my party, I have the privilege to speak to you tonight and show that young people in Montenegro have a vision for the future.

**Stimuli Montenegro:** I have the privilege to speak to you tonight and show that young **Montenegrins in Montenegro have a vision for the future.** 

**Stimuli Serbia:** I have the privilege to speak to you tonight and show that young **Serbs in Montenegro have a vision for the future.** 

We are sure that our youth can only help the development of Montenegro and our ideas come to understanding and support from older colleagues. Young people have the knowledge, skills and ability necessary in order for Montenegro to continue its European path and has become part of developed Europe.

Dear Citizens,

In addition to what I said earlier, I consider extremely important to show that we understand the problems that our country faces, and to realize how complex is to lead and

develop one city, one country. So I'll try to present to you in the next minute snippets of programs that we have developed in our youth organization.

The focus of our policy in the future must be economic development of Montenegro. Without a stable and strong economy, our entire tax system is compromised, which means fundamental rights that this state guarantees are compromised: free education for your children, quality health and reliable social security. Montenegro is blessed with great natural resources and up to now it formed the basis of our economy. Tourism. We must reinforce our position as a safe destination for future investments, which will reflect positively on the overall development of the state.

However, for the overall of the quality of life it is necessary to connect the north and south, to work on a number of infrastructure projects, invest in the development of the north so that the people from the north migrate to the southern part because they want to, not because they have to. In order to secure the development we must be more aggressive towards attracting foreign capital. This implies free cash flow, low operating costs and investment environment supported by domestic and foreign banks.

It is noteworthy that the openness of capital markets and easier business conditions may in no way be at the expense of Montenegrin workers. We must draw the line and stay consistent in protection of economic rights of all citizens. Without a strong middle class Montenegro does not have a European future. The workers in my company can attest that in the last 2 years we continuously expand our business, we are investing in the improvement of working conditions and we are never late with the payment of wages and benefits. Principles that I use in my business company, we have incorporated into our political program, and our successful business testifies that we have the knowledge and experience to fulfill our promises and implement the reforms at the national level.

The time that I have available stand out so I have exposure to an end. I hope I have managed to get you closer to the dedication and effort expended and that my youth colleague invest every day to keep us waiting for better times.

For a better tomorrow<sup>26</sup>.

Stimuli Montenegro: For a better tomorrow, Marko Jablan

Stimuli Serbia: For a better tomorrow, Rastko Bulatović

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>As an additional differences I used different versions of the words tomorrow, north etc. Versions associated with the Montenegrin language and new Montenegrin alphabet, or the versions associated with the Serbian "ekavski" dialekt. Furthermore, The Montenegrin stimuli was written in the Montenegrin alphabet, while Serbian stimuli was writen i cirilics(politicaly associated with Serbian language).

#### **Post-Treatment Questionnaire Draft**

Thank youfor your participation inour study of political speeches. We would now like to know what you think of the speech you have just read. Your answers will remain confidential and your identity will not be revealed please take time to answer all questions, and give your true opinion.

- 1. In your opinion, towhat ethnic group the candidate belongs, (first namepolitician))?
  - 1. Montenegrins
  - 2. Serbs
  - 3. Bosniaks
  - 4. Albanians
  - 5. Croats
  - 6. Muslim
  - 7. Other
- 2. When youthink about themerits of thecandidate, do you pay attention to hisnationality?
  - 1. Yes
  - 2. No
- 3. In general, are you more likely to vote for acandidate from thesame ethnic group as you as opposed to a candidate whodoes not come from the same ethnic group?
  - 1. Yes
  - 2. No
- 4. On a scale of1 to 7, overall how would you rate the quality of the speech (politician's name) youjust read? (Circle the applicable option)

(1= very bad,7=excellent)

 $1\quad 2\quad 3\quad 4\quad 5\quad 6\quad 7$ 

5. Doesthespeech(politician's name) makes you wantto favourthis candidate? (Circle the applicable option)

(1= no,not at all,7= yes,absolutely)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

- 6. In your opinion, is the author of the speech (politicians name): (circle the mention of your choice)
  - 1. Very unpleasant
  - 2. Unpleasant
  - 3. Neither unpleasant nor friendly
  - 4. Friendly
  - 5. Very friendly
- 7. In your opinion, is the author of the speech (the first politicianname)?(circlethe mention of your choice)
  - Not at allclever
     Alittle intelligence
     Intelligent
     Smart enough
     very intelligent
- 8. In your opinion, is the author of the speech (the first politicianname)? (circle the mention of your choice)
  - Not at alltrustworthy
     Anuntrustworthy
     Trustworthy
     Trustworthy enough
     Very trustworthy
- 9. In your opinion, is the author of the speech (the first politicianname)? (circlethe mention of your choice)
  1. Competent
  2. Somewhat competent
  - 3.Proficient
  - 4.CompetentEnough
  - 5. Verycompetent

Based on thespeech youhave just read, do you agree with the following statements? (1 = strongly disagree,7=strongly agree)

(Circle the applicable option)

10. Thecandidate(1stpolitician's name), will be in grannyto facethechallengesof the mandate

 $1\,2\,3\,4\,5\,6\,7$ 

11. I wasimpressed by thecandidate(1stpolitician's name)

12. I agree with the politicalideas of(1 politician's name)

1234567

13. The candidate(1stpolitician's name), has good reasonstostand for election 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

#### 14. If elected, (first namepolitician) would doa good job

#### $1\,2\,3\,4\,5\,6\,7$

- 15. If elected, the candidate, (first name politician), defendothers and would fight for his ideals  $1\,2\,3\,4\,5\,6\,7$
- 16. If there were an election held tomorrow, how likely is that you would vote for the list that the author of the speech represents?
- 1. Very unlikely
- 2. Unlikely
- 3. Neither unlikely nor likely
- 4. Likely
- 5. Very likely

#### Stimuli: Newspaper Article (Neutral Group)

#### Investigation on the purchase of ID cards

Basic State Prosecutor's Office began to investigate the allegations relating to the latest footage of alleged vote buying, which was published last week by the Network for Affirmation of NGO Sector (MANS).

From the non-government sector they comment that if an investigation should be exercised according to the rule of law principle this time will come to concrete results. From the audio recordings is evident that there is a (direct) agreement to acquire identity cards, so we believe that the next logical and legal step indictments, say at MANS.

On that occasion, the Prosecutor's Office stated that the investigation is still at an early stage and that removal of the details to the public would jeopardize the investigation. What we can say is that the decision to issue indictments will be made on the basis of evidence collected during the investigation process and not on the basis of media speculation, the Prosecution concludes.

#### Political parties Youth buying votes?

According to unofficial information, the police have conducted several investigations trough which evidence was collected against several persons. In the first place the police approached the analysis of telephone and online communication and took statements from persons suspected to have committed a criminal offense.

In addition to publicly known actors recordings released by MANS, police source whose identity is known to the editor, alleges that the buying of identity cards involved at least three youth member of the party concerned.

**Stimuli Montenegro:**In addition topublicly knownactorsrecordingsreleased byMANS, police sourcewhose identity isknown to the editor, allegesthat thebuying of identitycardsinvolvedat leastthree youthmember of the partyin question**of which the central figure is MarkoJablanfrom Cetinje.** 

**Stimuli Serbia**:In addition topublicly knownactorsrecordingsreleased byMANS, police sourcewhose identity isknown to the editor, allegesthat thebuying of identitycardsinvolvedat leastthree youthmember of the partyin question**of which the central figure is Rastko Bulatovićfrom Berane**.

We remind that in May 2014 the Executive Director of MANS Vanja Ćalović said at an extraordinary press conference that the audio recordings were made by employees of the MANS, adding that the reason of making them public is saving time for Prosecutor's Office not to investigate who made recordings but who buys ID cards.

#### 2<sup>nd</sup> Stimuli Post-testQuestionnaire

- 17. How likely is that the allegations from a newspaper article about the author, whose speech you read in the earlier stages of this research are true?
  - a) Highly unlikely that they are true
  - b) Very unlikely that they are true
  - c) Nor likely nor unlikely
  - d) Very likely that they are true
  - e) Highly likely that they are true
  - f)
- 18. Has the article made you change your opinion on the candidate?
  - a) Yes, I've changed my opinion for worse
  - b) Yes, I've changed my opinion for better
  - c) No I haven't changed my opinion
- 19. In your opinion, is the author of the speech (the first politicianname)? (circle mention of your choice)
  - 1. Not at alltrustworthy
  - 2. Anuntrustworthy
  - 3.Trustworthy
  - 4. Trustworthy enough
  - 5. Very trustworthy
- 20. In your opinion, is the author of the speech (the first politicianname)? (circlethe mention of your choice)1. Competent
  - 2.Somewhatcompetent
  - 3.Proficient

#### 4.CompetentEnough

- 5. Verycompetent
- 21. If there were an election held tomorrow, how likely is that you would vote for the list that the author of the speech and the person from the article represents?
- 1. Very unlikely
- 2. Unlikely
- 3. Neither unlikely nor likely
- 4. Likely
- 5. Very likely

Nowwe wantto know more aboutyourself andyour political views. These responses areonlyto betterinform usonwhatthe people whoparticipated in the studyandtheir political views. The information collected will betreated confidentially-thank youforanswer all thequestions.

- 22. Generally, to what extent are you interested in politics? (circle the appropriate option) (1= no,not at all,7= yes,very much)
  - 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- 23. Are you a member of a political party?(circlethe wordsthat apply)
  - 1. Yes
  - 2. No

24. If so,which party are you a member of? \_\_\_\_\_

25. For whomdid you vote in the Montenegrin parliamentary elections in 2012?

- 1. DPS / Demokratska partija socijalista
- 2. SDP / Socijaldemokarstka partija
- 3. DF/Demokratski front
- 4. SNP / Socijalistička narodna partija
- 5. POZITIVNA Crna Gora
- 6. GP/Građanski pokret
- 7. BS/ Bošnjačka stranka
- 8. DSCG / Demokratski savez u CG
- 9. DUA / Demokratska unija Albanaca
- 10. AA/ "Albanska alternativa"
- 11. HGI / Hrvatska građanska inicijativa
- 12. FORCA
- 13. LPCG / Liberalna partija CG
- 14. Did not vote

Didn't had the right to vote
 Some other, which \_\_\_\_\_

## **Tables and Charts**

	Principal Components												
	Comp.1	Comp.2	Comp.3	Comp.4	Comp.5	Comp.6	Comp.7	Comp.8	Comp.9	Comp.1			
Variables:		•	•	•									
Government	-0.38	-0.35	0.03	-0.21	0.09	-0.11	-0.10	0.11	0.42	0.68			
Parliament	-0.37	-0.27	0.15	-0.27	0.25	-0.37	0.07	0.47	-0.21	-0.47			
President	-0.30	-0.34	0.4	0.04	-0.31	-0.08	0.27	-0.62	-0.25	-0.03			
Political Parties	-0.34	0.06	-0.27	-0.45	-0.41	0.28	-0.50	-0.13	0.06	-0.28			
Judiciary	-0.34	0.06	-0.11	0.06	0.01	0.67	0.48	0.30	-0.21	0.11			
Police	-0.38	0.06	-0.25	0.20	0.72	0.09	-0.14	-0.45	0.05	-0.15			
NGOs	-0.25	0.36	-0.57	-0.04	-0.20	-0.53	0.34	-0.09	-0.14	0.16			
Church	-0.15	-0.40	-0.29	0.73	-0.27	-0.07	-0.25	0.20	0.01	-0.09			
EU	-0.29	0.42	0.34	0.24	-0.15	-0.07	0.15	0.05	0.65	-0.27			
NATO	-0.27	0.45	0.37	0.19	-0.00	-0.08	-0.45	0.13	-0.47	0.31			
Variance	0.39	0.16	0.09	0.08	0.06	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.02			
Cumulative	0.39	0.55	0.62	0.73	0.8	0.85	0.9	0.94	0.97	1			